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The purpose of this report is to recommend and test an empirical strategy for assessing 
the impact that concealed carry policies have on crime at college and university 
campuses. I use panel data obtained from the Department of Education for all crimes 
reported on four-year, undergraduate, federal financial aid-receiving institutions between 
2001 and 2014 to model the impact of campus carry legislation. Differences in legislation 
across states, time, and school types allow for estimation of a triple difference regression 
model. Results of OLS estimations show that campus carry has no significant observable 
association with crime rates of aggravated assault, sexual assault, robbery, burglary, and 
motor theft committed on campus at the 95% confidence interval. These results are robust 
to a number of different assumptions, including time lag and negative binomial modeling 
approaches. However, true effects may be difficult to determine precisely as model 
estimations present large standard errors. Notably, my analysis does not attempt to 
control for variables that may also influence campus crime rates, such as local economic 
conditions, gun ownership rates, or rates of concealed carrying on campus. This analysis 
is therefore only a starting point for further research and the results contained here should 
be considered preliminary. At most, my analysis may throw partisan narratives 
surrounding campus carry into some measure of doubt. In particular, results fail to 
 vii 
demonstrate a measurable deterrent effect theorized by campus carry advocates, or a 
criminal enabling effect theorized by opponents of the policy. Regardless of crime 
changes, I suggest that policymakers considering this controversial measure should also 
weigh how concealed carrying policies may influence a variety of other variables, 
including student suicides – a full understanding of which requires considerable caution 
and further research.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
THE LARGER LANDSCAPE OF CAMPUS CARRY 
 
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), as of 2015, 
each U.S. state allowed private individuals who satisfy certain requirements to carry 
concealed handguns in most public spaces, provided they acquire a state-issued license.1 
Higher education institutions have traditionally been among the public areas where 
concealed handgun carry is prohibited.2 This approach remains the dominant one across 
the United States.3 As of 2015, 19 states explicitly banned concealed carry of handguns at 
colleges and universities, while another 23 states allowed the decision to be made at the 
institutional level.4 Although there is a paucity of research surrounding the subject, higher 
education institutions allowed to regulate their own environments appear to have banned 
handgun carrying nearly universally.5 As such, 42 states have implemented either de jure 
or de facto bans on the concealed carry of handguns on college and university campuses. 
Individuals found in possession of a handgun on campus property in these states have 
generally been subject to penalties such as fines and misdemeanor or felony convictions.6  
Increasingly, however, gun laws have become de-regulated at the state level to 
allow for concealed handgun carry in higher education institutions, overturning the 
historical norms in these settings. From 2004 to 2015, eight states passed laws or issued 
court decisions that effectively allowed the concealed carry of firearms on college and 
university campuses, thereby implementing the policy colloquially known as “campus 
                                                 
1
 “Guns on Campus: Overview,” National Conference of State Legislatures, May 10, 2015, accessed 
December 5, 2015, http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/guns-on-campus-overview.aspx. 
2 “Concealed Weapons Permitting Policy Summary,” Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, accessed April 
25, 2016, http://smartgunlaws.org/concealed-weapons-permitting-policy-summary/. 
3
 “Guns in Schools Policy Summary,” Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, accessed March 14, 2016, 
http://smartgunlaws.org/guns-in-schools-policy-summary/. 
4
 “Guns on Campus: Overview,” National Conference of State Legislatures. 
5
 Alan Schwarz, “A Bid for Guns on Campuses to Deter Rape,” U.S. (The New York Times), February 19, 
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/us/in-bid-to-allow-guns-on-campus-weapons-are-linked-to-
fighting-sexual-assault.html?_r=0. 
6 “Campus Carry: Frequently Asked Questions,” University of Texas at San Antonio, n.d., accessed May 4, 
2016, http://www.utsa.edu/campuscarry/faqs.html#q9. 
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carry.” 7 Though policy effective dates are somewhat unclear in certain states, for ease of 
exposition they are generally the following: Utah (court action, effective 2006), Colorado 
(court action, effective 2010-2012), Oregon (court action, effective 2011), Mississippi 
(legislation, effective 2011), Wisconsin (legislation, effective 2011), Kansas (legislation, 
effective 2014), Idaho (legislation, effective 2014), and Texas (legislation, effective 
2016).8 Each state’s approach to the policy possesses some level of uniqueness, but the 
general effect across these states is to allow the concealed carry of handguns on the 
campuses of public colleges and universities by concealed handgun license holders.9 I 
turn to a more in-depth explanation of these policy changes in a subsequent section.  
This trend of state-level policy change may continue. According to NCSL, at least 
19 state legislatures attempted to pass campus carry laws in 2013, and 14 state 
legislatures attempted to do so in 2014.10 A question of increasing importance to many 
higher education institutions is therefore whether and to what degree campus carry 
policies alter the safety of the campus environment.  
The impact of campus carry policies within higher education settings has been 
hotly debated. Advocates for and against implementation of the policy have made strong 
claims about how introducing concealed handguns into the campus environment affects a 
number of variables, including crimes, suicides, accidents, incidents of intimidation and 
micro-aggression, and feelings of insecurity that may inhibit freedom of academic 
speech, among others.11 Though these discussions are important, I emphasize that the 
substantive focus of my analysis is aimed specifically on the association of concealed 
carry and incidents of on-campus crime. The debate is wide in scope and there may (or 
                                                 
7
 “Guns on Campus: Overview,” National Conference of State Legislatures. 
8
 Ibid. Also, note that I do not include Arkansas in my analysis, which allows only qualified university 
faculty to carry concealed weapons on public college and university campuses, according to Arkansas state 
law HB 1243. I also decline to include Florida and Kentucky, which allow concealed handguns only in 
locked vehicles on university property. 
9 Though Kansas, Oregon, and Wisconsin have uncertain or very strict approaches to the law – a point I 
elaborate on later in this report.  
10
 “Guns on Campus: Overview,” National Conference of State Legislatures.   
11 University of Texas at Austin, Campus Carry Policy Working Group: Final Report, 2015 
https://utexas.app.box.com/CCWorkingGroup-FinalReport.  
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may not) be substantive impacts produced on any number of variables, but the analysis 
here focuses only on intentional crime committed on campus property, including 
aggravated assault, sexual assault, robbery, burglary, and motor theft. 
A DEBATE ON GUN RIGHTS 
 
At its most fundamental level, debates on campus carry invoke disagreements 
surrounding rights to firearms in general. Campus carry might therefore be seen as one 
facet of the nation’s larger, ongoing effort to determine the extent of an individual’s right 
to access firearms, particularly in public spaces. Advocates for and against campus carry 
have often taken arguments developed from this wider debate on handguns and applied 
them to the narrow context of college and university settings. As such, it is not that 
campus carry represents a unique discussion per se, but rather a focused version of the 
debate on gun rights and the public consequences of these gun rights. Though the goal of 
this report is not to discuss this wider debate over the association between handgun carry 
and crime at the general public level, it inevitably references and borrows from it – as 
both advocates and opponents of campus carry do as well.  
ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
The debate on the association between campus carry and crime might be simply 
represented by two competing intellectual perspectives: advocate and opponent. The 
perspective of the campus carry advocate argues, in part, that the constitutional right to 
bear a firearm should apply in all geographic settings, and that the traditional ban of 
handguns on campus is unwarranted.12  
Beyond a discussion on individual rights, this perspective also suggests that 
expanding the number of spaces within which a handgun owner can take their weapon 
effectively protects them from potential criminal action through a deterrent effect. The 
                                                 
12 “Students For Concealed Carry: About,” Students For Concealed Carry, 2011, accessed May 4, 2016, 
http://concealedcampus.org/about/. 
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deterrent effect theorizes that when criminals must factor in the uncertainty of whether or 
not a potential victim is armed, they face a significant disincentive toward offensive 
action. The advocate suggests that by expanding this deterrent to higher education 
settings, criminal action might be stopped before it is ever committed in these areas.  
One noted champion of this perspective is John Lott, who has argued that counties 
with “Shall-issue” laws (e.g. laws mandating that a state issue concealed handgun 
licenses for those who apply and meet minimum criteria) experience decreases in violent 
crime rates compared to areas without these laws.13 Lott’s work, which was the focus of 
an extensive evaluation by the National Research Council in 2004, has largely been 
refuted by academics on methodological grounds.14 Nevertheless, his conclusions on the 
theory of deterrence have largely provided the intellectual foundation for the campus 
carry movement and continue to be invoked as justification for the policy in current 
debates.15  
Proponents of this theory claim that the deterrence effect is also observable by 
recorded incidents of self-defense gun use. For example, the criminologist Gary Kleck 
has used survey data to argue that potential crime victims who are armed effectively stop 
or prevent millions of crimes each year, and therefore concealed carry should be extended 
to college and university campuses.16 The Cato Institute – a libertarian think tank – has 
added support for Kleck’s analysis, citing over 5,000 apparent news reports of self-
defense gun use.17 Though the methodological grounds upon which Kleck develops this 
                                                 
13
 John R. Lott, More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun Control Laws, Third Edition, 3rd 
ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
14 National Research Council, Firearms and Violence: A Critical Review, ed. Charles Wellford, John 
Pepper, and Carol Petrie (United States: National Academies Press, 2004), doi:10.17226/10881. 
15John R Lott, “A Look at the Facts on Gun-Free Zones,” National Review, April 25, 2016, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/425802/gun-free-zones-don't-save-lives-right-to-carry-laws-do. 
16
 David Burnett and Cramer Clayton, Tough Targets: When Criminals Face Armed Resistance From 
Criminals, Cato Institute, 2012, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/WP-Tough-Targets.pdf. 
17
 Ibid.  
 5 
claim have been disputed by public health researchers18, his analysis remains an actively 
cited argument in ongoing campus carry debates.19 
It may be worth noting that the arguments used by Lott and Kleck are structured 
at the societal level, and their application toward the campus environment has not been 
demonstrated as a valid extrapolation. In other words, Lott and Kleck have not attempted 
analyses on how concealed carry changes crime rates on campus specifically, but suggest 
– without empirical verification visible in the existing literature – that their studies at the 
societal level should still apply in a potentially different environment.  
Notable advocacy groups such as Students for Concealed Carry endorse the 
deterrence perspective as well, further pointing to the lack of high-profile criminal 
incidents on campuses that allow concealed carry – such as those in Colorado in Utah – 
as proof of its existence.20 In recent years, this argument has been adopted by 
conservative state legislators, who have made particularly strong support for the claim 
that allowing females to concealed carry on campus could serve to deter incidents of 
sexual assault.21  
Deterrence theory aside, campus carry advocacy groups might still argue the 
merits of campus carry even in the event that the policy provides no measurable crime 
reduction. For example, Students for Concealed Carry claims that, no matter the 
likelihood of crime, past incidents of mass school shootings demonstrate that campus 
occupants should have the right to protect themselves by retaining access to handguns in 
both the classroom and general campus environment.22 It is beyond the scope of this 
report to evaluate whether such a position is justified. But this line of argument 
demonstrates that the advocate perspective tends to enshrine individual rights, while 
                                                 
18 David Hemenway, “Survey Research and Self-Defense Gun Use: An Explanation of Extreme 
Overestimates,” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 87, no. 4 (1997), doi:10.2307/1144020. 
19 Ryan Ray, “Gun Bills Move Forward in Early Committee Action,” Florida Politics, September 16, 
2015, http://floridapolitics.com/archives/190411-gun-bills-move-forward-in-early-committee-action. 
20
 Common Arguments Against Campus Carry, Students for Concealed Carry, 2011, 
http://concealedcampus.org/common-arguments/#1. 
21
 Alan Schwarz, “A Bid for Guns on Campuses to Deter Rape.” 
22
 “Crime on College Campuses in the U.S,” Students for Concealed Carry, 2011, accessed February 27, 
2016, http://concealedcampus.org/campus-crime/. 
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declining more nuanced cost-benefit analyses that invoke the importance of public health 
considerations. This focus on individual rights typically reflects the advocate’s 
association with conservative ideology.  
OPPONENT’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
On the other hand, the perspective of the campus carry opponent suggests that the 
impact of campus carry is not crime-reducing. According to this perspective, in the best 
case the policy is likely to have no observable impact on crime. These opponents suggest 
that campus carry policies likely have no impact on a factor that is more determinative of 
crime rates: the existing stock and availability of guns in society at large. Indeed, the 
policy might theoretically change the flow of legal handgun carrying to a limited extent, 
but the significance of these changes is likely to be dwarfed by American society’s 
mostly unfettered access to a pre-existing supply of guns. Thus, according to opponents, 
to measure the impact of campus carry is to measure a policy without a truly discernible 
effect on crime, as limited changes in handgun carrying are not sufficient to produce 
observable impact on these larger undercurrents. In such an event, any observable 
correlation between campus carry and crime rates would point to a third, entirely separate 
factor responsible for the true change in crime.  
Moreover, in the worst case, campus carry opponents fear that the policy may 
provide an enabling effect for criminality. In stark contrast to the advocate’s perspective, 
opponents often contend that increasing access to handguns among students enables an 
attacker rather than providing defense for a victim. One argument made in this regard is 
that increasing student access to handguns may promote poor decision-making that 
results in incidents of sexual assault. The opponent group Campaign to Keep Guns Off 
Campus, for example, cites data showing that rates of sexual assault have increased on 
campus in Utah and Colorado – two campus carry states. 23 However, this data alone does 
                                                 
23 “The Campaign to Keep Guns Off Campus’ New Study Shows That on-Campus Crime Rates Have 
Increased in Two States Where Concealed Carry on Campus Is Allowed,” Campaign to Keep Guns Off 
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not provide compelling evidence of the policy’s impact. Rates of sexual assault have 
increased on campuses across the country, both in states where the policy is active and in 
those where it is not, in both public and private schools. Data discussed later in this report 
will corroborate this point.  
In addition, opponents voice considerable anxiety about the potential impact of 
the policy on a number of other variables aside from crime. In particular, opponents of 
campus carry worry that liberalizing gun laws in college and university campuses 
introduces unnecessary risk in a variety of ways. Advocacy groups such as Students for 
Gun Free Schools24 and Campaign to Keep Guns Off Campus25 have alleged that 
expanding handgun carrying may increase the potential for incidents of student suicide, 
accidents, intimidation, untrained use of weapons, and vigilantism on campus, while 
failing to provide measurable crime reduction. Such groups often point to research 
conducted by David Hemenway, a public health scientist, that alleges a strong connection 
between student gun ownership on campus and risk-taking behavior, such as binge 
drinking.26 Public health researchers like Hemenway also push back against the notion of 
the deterrence effect, claiming that no compelling empirical evidence exists to 
demonstrate it.27  
Finally, opponents point to data showing that campus environments generally 
experience less crime than other areas, even before the advent of campus carry policies.28 
Calls for added security therefore misunderstand the reality that most campuses are 
                                                                                                                                                 




 Why Our Campuses Are Safer Without Concealed Handguns, Students for Gun Free Schools, 2008, 
http://www.studentsforgunfreeschools.org/SGFSWhyOurCampuses-Electronic.pdf. 
25
 Why Our Campuses Are Safer Without Concealed Handguns, Campaign to Keep Guns Off Campus, 
2015, http://keepgunsoffcampus.org/blog/category/resources/. 
26
 Matthew Miller, David Hemenway, and Henry Wechsler, “Guns and Gun Threats at College,” Journal 
of American College Health 51, no. 2 (September 2002), doi:10.1080/07448480209596331. 
27
 David Hemenway and Sara J. Solnick, “The Epidemiology of Self-Defense Gun Use: Evidence from the 
National Crime Victimization Surveys 2007–2011,” Preventive Medicine 79 (October 2015), 
doi:10.1016/j.ypmed.2015.03.029. 
28
 Timothy C Hart, Characteristics of Violent Crime Victims, 1995-2000 College Students, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, 2003, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vvcs00.pdf. 
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comparatively safe locations, and the policy would merely serve as source of unnecessary 
risk to the public health. This perspectives is widely endorsed by members of the campus 
community, including college and university presidents29, faculty30, and students31. In a 
basic sense, these perspectives are generally associated with the progressive ideology, 
which tends to move away from discussions on individual rights in favor of community 
outcomes. 
LIMITS OF INTERPRETING EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 It is worth briefly qualifying the significance of my forthcoming analysis of 
campus carry and crime. Champions of both perspectives – with conservatives typically 
as advocates and progressives typically as opponents – might rightfully point to the issue 
of unknowable counterfactuals. For example, imagine the case that campus carry schools 
showed no crime reduction compared to non-campus carry schools. A conservative might 
continue advocating for the policy by responding that crime rates would have risen at 
campus carry schools if these institutions had not implemented the policy. On the other 
hand, imagine that campus carry schools did show crime reduction compared to their 
counterparts. A progressive might continue to decry the policy by responding that the 
legislation itself had nothing to do with change in crime rates. Rather, the legislation may 
have simply been a signal of broader cultural changes, the latter of which was the true 
determinant of decreased crime. It is worth noting that even observable changes in crime 
rates that align with policy change fail to demonstrate a causal nexus. Fortunately, though 
causality cannot be demonstrated with certainty, the influence of confounding factors 
                                                 
29
 James H. Price et al., “University Presidents’ Perceptions and Practice Regarding the Carrying of 
Concealed Handguns on College Campuses,” Journal of American College Health 62, no. 7 (September 
16, 2014), doi:10.1080/07448481.2014.920336. 
30
 Amy Thompson et al., “Faculty Perceptions and Practices Regarding Carrying Concealed Handguns on 
University Campuses,” Journal of Community Health 38, no. 2 (October 23, 2012), doi:10.1007/s10900-
012-9626-0. 
31
 Ryan Patten, Matthew O. Thomas, and James C. Wada, “Packing Heat: Attitudes Regarding Concealed 
Weapons on College Campuses,” American Journal of Criminal Justice 38, no. 4 (November 15, 2012), 
doi:10.1007/s12103-012-9191-1. 
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inherent to this discussion can be closely controlled for through regression analysis – one 
of the central features of this report.  
 In addition to the epistemological limitations noted above, potential policy 
implications of such a review should be qualified as well. In a very rudimentary sense, 
policymakers might be tempted to judge the merits of campus carry solely on its 
relationship with crime rates. However, I suggest that a framework for evaluating campus 
carry must be far more comprehensive than consideration of a single variable. An 
analysis on the impact of this controversial policy is thus germane in the context of 
current public policy, but it hardly ends the debate. Rather, it might be interpreted simply 
as a starting point that other analysts can expand and improve upon in the future.  
 Though a broad analytical framework should be used by policymakers when 
evaluating the merits of campus carry, I think the particular nexus between crime and 
concealed carry on campus is still worth exploring. This is especially true considering 
that the competing perspectives on campus carry discussed above have seemingly not 
been evaluated in an econometric context. Indeed, there have been many attempts 
throughout the literature to assess the impact of various gun policies on crime in the 
wider public domain, but there has been no systematic review of the specific impact 
campus carry policies produce on campus crime (or at least no such reviews have been 
made public). Therefore, my goal is to try to illuminate these competing intellectual 
perspectives by conducting a quasi-experimental assessment to determine whether 
campus carry policies are, in fact, associated with any discernible changes in crime rates 
on college and university campuses.  
SUMMARIZING THE DISCUSSION AHEAD 
 
 In practice, campus carry is not a uniformly implemented policy. The eight states 
with some version of the practice used different mechanisms to implement it, and chose 
different on-the-ground approaches, with some states allowing more permissive handgun 
carrying than others. Moreover, to understand the broader policy landscape of campus 
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carry, the implementation of these measures should be framed within the context of a 
nationwide liberalizing of “right to carry” laws, which articulate how much authority a 
state government has to regulate handgun carrying. Together, these trends point to a 
gradual expansion of public spaces that permit handgun carrying and decreased state 
authority to refuse granting a license to carry.  
 Arguably, the push toward campus carry might be seen as originating from 
previous school shooting incidents. Indeed, the advent of groups lobbying in favor of the 
policy, such as Students for Concealed Carry, came immediately after the Virginia Tech 
tragedy.32 As discussed above, competing perspectives have increasingly contended for 
dominance of this discussion since this tragedy, with conservatives typically as advocates 
of the policy and progressives as opponents. Conservatives have commonly asserted that 
the policy reduces crime through deterrence, while opponents have contended that the 
policy has no likely impact on crime or, worse, that it provides an enabling effect for 
criminals.  
 Laying the foundation for an empirical discussion is a noteworthy body of 
econometric literature focusing specifically on how concealed carry policies affect crime 
rates in the broader public domain, which I will explore briefly. I attempt to refine this 
discussion down to the campus level with my own empirical analysis. Fortunately, 
information pertaining to crimes on college and university campuses has been collected 
in a robust fashion after passage of the Clery Act in the early 1990s. I use campus-level 
crime data from 2001 to 2014 from the Department of Education, capturing the time 
period when campus carry policies were implemented. Differences in campus carry 
policies across states, school types, and time provides a natural experiment to observe the 
effect of the policy. I conduct this quasi-experiment by using regression analysis, 
including OLS and negative binomial modeling, with and without time lag effects.  
 Ultimately, the results from my model estimations cast doubt on partisan 
narratives suggesting that campus carry decreases crime through deterrence on the one 
                                                 




hand, or that it enables criminal activity on the other. However, these results are 
inseparable from critical assumptions I make in assigning treatment effects. These 
assumptions are made in an attempt to best reflect the on-the-ground realities of different 
states, but they are assumptions nonetheless. Furthermore, additional improvements must 
be made to my approach before definitive results can be obtained, as my models do not 
control for a number of variables that may also explain variations in crime rates. I discuss 
the results of my empirical analysis and its limitations in more detail later in this report.  
 As I have alluded to above, policymakers seeking a robust discussion on the 
merits of campus carry should look beyond a narrow focus on crime trends, regardless of 
the empirical results contained here. The wider body of public health literature has long 
suggested that handgun access is a risk factor for suicide within adolescent and young 
adult demographics. This should be considered within the campus carry decision 
framework, and those states choosing to implement the policy should build substantive 
protections of the public health within their approach, such as safe storage requirements, 
safe handgun carrying practices, and close monitoring of trends related to student 
suicides and handgun accidents.   
 12 
Chapter 2:  Policy Background 
CAMPUS CRIME AND THE CLERY ACT 
 
Any discussion on campus carry is intrinsically tied to a larger discussion on 
campus crime generally. As noted previously, campus environments are comparatively 
low-risk areas for crime, particularly violent crime. Student populations have historically 
been victimized by violent crime at lower rates than their non-student counterparts of the 
same age, and most crimes against students have occurred off campus.33 Importantly, 
these trends were visible before the advent of campus carry policies. A 2003 Bureau of 
Justice Statistics (BJS) report noted that, from 1995 to 2000, college students experienced 
violent crimes at a rate of 68 per 1,000 persons, while non-students of the same age-range 
experienced violent crimes at a rate of 82 per 1,000 persons over this period.34 Moreover, 
BJS noted in this report that eighty-five percent of crimes against students living on 
campus occurred off campus, and that ninety-five percent of crimes against students 
living off campus also occurred off campus.35 Another 2014 BJS report noted that non-
student females from age 18-24 were 1.2 times more likely than student females of the 
same age to experience sexual assault, though the report did not discuss on-campus / off-
campus differences.36  
Even in spite of their comparative safety, campus environments almost inevitably 
experience both violent and non-violent crimes. Prior to 1990, however, the federal 
government did not mandate that higher education institutions collect and report uniform 
crime statistics on their campuses. As such, no systematic data existed on crime within 
college and university settings. This changed following the rape and murder of Jeanne 
                                                 
33 Timothy C Hart, Characteristics of Violent Crime Victims. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Lynn Langton and Sofi Sinozich, Rape and Sexual Assault Victimization Among College-Age Females, 
1995–2013, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf. 
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Clery, a student at Lehigh University, in her dorm building in 1986.37 In response to this 
tragedy and the nation’s collective desire to begin monitoring campus crime, Congress 
passed the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime 
Statistics Act (Clery Act) in 1990.38 The law, which remains in effect today, mandates 
that all college and universities receiving federal financial aid must report annual crime 
statistics to the Department of Education (ED). Crimes that occur both on and 
immediately around campus must be reported and the type of criminal incident must be 
specified as well. Institutions that violate that Clery Act by failing to report incidents 
receive substantial financial penalties: each crime incident that is not reported bears a fine 
of $35,000.39 The extensive and uniform reporting produced by the Clery Act has opened 
up the possibility for systematic empirical evaluations of campus crime in ways that were 
not possible before the Act.  
RIGHT TO CARRY LAWS 
 
As mentioned above, trends in campus carry should be understood within the 
larger context of Right to Carry (RTC) laws. These laws refer to state policies that allow 
civilians to publicly carry handguns openly or concealed in public.40 States with some 
version of RTC law typically grant a concealed handguns license to a properly vetted 
individual upon successful application through a state agency, thereby allowing the 
license holder to lawfully possess a handgun in public. In campus carry states, concealed 
handgun license holders can legally possess handguns on campuses of public colleges 
and universities (with some caveats discussed later), as long as these handguns are kept 
                                                 
37 “Crime in Schools and Colleges: A Study of Offenders and Arrestees Reported via National Incident-
Based Reporting System Data,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d., accessed April 24, 2016, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/crime-in-schools-and-colleges. 
38 Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act, 20 U.S.C. § 
1092(f), 34 C.F.R. 668.46 
39 “Crime in Schools and Colleges”, Federal Bureau of Investigation.  
40
 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GUN CONTROL States’ Laws and Requirements for 
Concealed Carry Permits Vary Across the Nation Report to Congressional Requesters, 2012, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592552.pdf. 
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concealed. The number of states with RTC laws has increased dramatically since the 
1980s, effectively ushering in a nationwide expansion of public domains that allow 
handgun carrying. In 1986, sixteen states had “no-issue” policies; at the time, these states 
effectively disallowed any form of handgun carrying in public spaces.41 By 2013, all fifty 
states had adopted some version of RTC laws. 42  
These laws vary in the discretion they give states to refuse licenses to applicants. 
According to the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, as of 2015, sixteen states had 
RTC laws described as “no discretion, shall-issue”.43 These states do not give the 
permitting agency any discretion to refuse licensure to an individual that completes an 
application and meets certain criteria. Another seventeen states had RTC laws described 
as “limited discretion, shall-issue” as of 2015. 44 These states can refuse licensure to 
qualifying individuals only in rare cases, such as when “law enforcement can produce a 
documented reason to believe the person is dangerous”.45 In other words, these 
individuals may have passed the minimum requirements to obtain a concealed carry 
permit, but the state retains the authority to refuse them a license. Another nine states had 
RTC laws described as “full discretion, may-issue” as of the same year.46 These states 
possess the ability to refuse a qualifying applicant for any reason, and generally also 
require applicants to provide a specific and legitimate need for a concealed carry permit 
(e.g. for defense against a stalker) in addition to character references. The remaining eight 
states were unrestricted in their licensing requirements as of 2015.47 Individuals in these 
remaining states can generally carry concealed handguns in public without first obtaining 
a license. These states do allow qualifying individuals to obtain a concealed handgun 
license, though again no license is required.   
                                                 
41
 David Kopel, “Growth Chart of Right to Carry,” The Washington Post, February 17, 2014, accessed 
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44 Ibid.  
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There is some variation in the discretionary status of the RTC laws adopted by the 
eight current campus carry states. Five campus carry states were “shall-issue” throughout 
2001 to 2014 (the entire time series considered in this report).48 The remaining three 
states include Colorado, which transitioned from “may-issue” to “shall-issue” in 2003; 
Kansas, which transitioned from “no-issue” to “shall-issue” in 2007; and Wisconsin, 
which transitioned from “no-issue” to “shall-issue” in 2011.49 As of 2014, Colorado, 
Utah, and Oregon allowed their permitting agencies limited discretion to refuse licensure 
to qualified applicants; Kansas, Idaho, Mississippi, Wisconsin, and Texas allowed no 
such discretion.50  
POLITICAL DYNAMICS 
 
The federal government has no regulations pertaining specifically to concealed 
handgun carry on college and university campuses, thereby allowing states to determine 
their own approaches. Only one state effectively mounted the political will to pass 
legislation compelling campus carry in public colleges and universities before 2007.51 
That state, Utah, passed amendments to state law in 2004 that prevented state public 
schools from banning concealed carry (though it struggled to enforce compliance from its 
resistant university system for several more years).52  
The dynamic of the nation’s discussion on gun rights in these settings changed 
significantly following the Virginia Tech mass shooting in 2007. Reacting to this tragedy, 
advocates for campus carry began mobilizing efforts to lobby for state-level 
implementation. Students for Concealed Carry, arguably the most notable of these post-
Virginia Tech advocacy groups, began actively encouraging state legislators to consider 
campus carry as a policy mechanism to protect students from further violence. These 
lobbying efforts have generated considerable legislative success. Campus carry proposals 
                                                 
48 “Concealed Weapons Permitting Policy Summary,” Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence..  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Colorado passed the Concealed Carry Act in 2003, but did not begin enforcing on campuses until 2010.  
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were introduced approximately seventy times from 2010 to 2015 in different state 
legislatures, with several measures becoming law, as discussed below.53 With the 
exception of Utah, passage of campus carry policies may be therefore seen in part as a 
reaction to the movement that grew from the Virginia Tech tragedy.  
As noted previously, enthusiasm for campus carry has not been reflected in the 
majority of the academic community. Several ideological rivals developed in response to 
the efforts of Students for Concealed Carry, including the Campaign to Keep Guns Off 
Campus and Students for Gun Free Schools. These opposing organizations also lobbied 
for their position at the state level in an attempt to stymie the increasing number of 
campus carry measures. Other policy groups weighed in on the issues, including 
members of campus law enforcement. For example, in March 2008, the International 
Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) drafted a report 
partially in response to increasing calls from policymakers advocating for passage of 
campus carry laws. In its report, the IACLEA refused to endorse campus carry as a 
means of improving campus safety54, saying that it did not believe concealed carry made 
campus safer55. Indeed, this report largely disapproved of the policy, and “[urged] public 
policy makers to proceed with extreme caution in dealing with proposals to allow college 
students to carry concealed weapons on campus.”56  
SPECIFICS ON STATE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES 
 
From 2004 to 2015, eight states took either legislative or court action to prevent 
their higher education institutions from banning concealed carry on campus. These 
campus carry policies were implemented at different points in time and through different  
                                                 
53 “State Legislation Updates from the Campaign to Keep Guns Off Campus,” The Campaign to Keep 
Guns Off Campus, accessed April 24, 2016, http://keepgunsoffcampus.org/state-battles/. 
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     Table 1. Campus Carry Details by State 
  
State 
Legislation        
(year passed) 
State Court Action                           








state law (2004) 
University of Utah v. Mark L. 
Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General 
(2006) 
2006 Very unrestrictive 
"Shall-issue" throughout 
2001 - 2014 
CO 
Concealed 
Handgun Act of 
2003 
Students for Concealed Carry v. 






issue" in 2003 
OR N/A 
Oregon Firearms Education v. 
Board of Higher Education 
(2011) 
2011 
OR Higher Ed Board voted in 




2001 - 2014 
MS HB 506 (2011) N/A 2011 
Mostly unrestrictive, with 
“enhanced permit” 
"Shall-issue" throughout 
2001 - 2014 
WI SB 93 (2011) N/A 2011 
Banned in most campus 
buildings with signage opt-outs 
written into law 
"No issue" to "shall issue" 
in 2011 
KS HB 2052 (2013) N/A 2014 
Four year opt-out waivers 
written into law, used by all 
campuses 
"No issue" to "shall issue" 
in 2007 
ID SB 1254 (2014) N/A 2014 
Mostly unrestrictive, with 
“enhanced permit” 
"Shall-issue" throughout 
2001 - 2014 
TX SB 11 (2015) N/A 2016 
To be determined by each 
campus, UT-Austin will allow 
carry inside classrooms 
"Shall-issue" throughout 
2001 - 2014 
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policy mechanisms (See Table 1). Though the specifics of each legislative or judicial 
approach were different, these policy changes have all had the effect of compelling public 
colleges and universities within the states to allow concealed handgun carry by properly 
licensed individuals. The timing and nature of each campus carry policy are an important 
consideration for the empirical work in this report, making a discussion on these details 
relevant.  
 In 2004, Utah became the first state to pass legislation allowing concealed 
handguns on campuses.57 Amendments to state law passed that year mandated that higher 
education settings be subject to the same concealed carry regulations applicable 
throughout the state, and that colleges and universities therefore lacked the authority to 
ban concealed carrying.58 However, higher education institutions originally refused 
compliance with the law, ultimately challenging it in the state supreme court. In 2006, the 
state supreme court upheld the law in University of Utah vs. Shurtleff, and ordered that 
public campuses in the state were required to allow concealed carrying.59 According to 
Students for Concealed Carry, public colleges and universities officially began allowing 
concealed handgun carrying in the fall semester of 2006.60 Utah public colleges and 
universities, as a result, allow permissive concealed carry for qualifying individuals. The 
UT-Austin Campus Carry Working Group – a body of students, faculty, and community 
members responsible for devising a campus carry implementation strategy in Texas’ 
flagship university – notes the only restriction allowed in these campuses is the creation 
of a single carve-out (e.g. gun-free) zone. In an official report to UT-Austin, the Working 
Group noted that: “Utah allows each public university to establish one secure area as a 
hearing room and to create a rule that allows dormitory residents to request only 
                                                 
57
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60
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roommates who are not licensed to carry a concealed firearm.”61 No other carrying 
restrictions appear to be allowed by the state’s law.  
In 2003, Colorado passed the Concealed Handgun Act of 2003 (CCA), expanding 
concealed carry privileges to “all areas of the state.”62 However, the Board of Regents of 
the University of Colorado (CU) System maintained that it had the authority to ban 
concealed handguns on public college grounds after passage of this law, and it continued 
to do so even after 2003.63 However, in 2010, the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled (in 
Students for Concealed Carry v. Regents of the University of Colorado) that CU’s ban on 
campus carry violated the CCA.64 The CU System appealed this decision, and in 2012 the 
Supreme Court of Colorado ruled against the appeal. 65 The ruling on this appeal 
effectively removed a de facto ban on campus carry at CU campuses.66 However, both 
the Cato Institute67 and Students for Concealed Carry68 note that Colorado State 
University allowed concealed carry starting the fall semester of 2003, and the remaining 
public colleges and universities in the state (aside from the CU system) allowed 
concealed carry starting the fall semester of 2010.69  In any case, compared to Utah’s 
approach, Colorado seems only slightly more restrictive of concealed carrying. 
According to the UT-Austin Campus Carry Working Group, CU-Boulder has continued 
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to carve out areas that prohibit handguns, such as athletic stadiums and other performance 
venues, in spite of the state court’s ruling.70  
In 2011, Wisconsin introduced campus carry via legislation with SB 93, making 
the law effective in the same year.71 However, the law included a provision that allows 
campuses to ban concealed carrying within campus buildings, as long as certain signage 
is posted at every building entrance and exist.72 According to NCSL, as of 2015, every 
public college and university in Wisconsin appeared to be using this signage, effectively 
limiting campus carry to public grounds outside of buildings.73 
In 2011, Mississippi passed campus carry via legislation with HB 506 in 2011, 
making the law effective on July 1, 2011.74 When asked to clarify the law, Mississippi 
Attorney General Jim Hood released a memo in 2012 stating that concealed carriers also 
required an “enhanced” training permit in order to carry on college and university 
campuses.75 Even so, according to the Campaign to Keep Guns Off Campus, state law 
remains somewhat unclear and some “public colleges and universities have banned 
firearms from dorms, event centers, and dining halls.”76 
In 2011, the Oregon Court of Appeals ruled (in Oregon Firearms Education v. 
Board of Higher Education) that a ban on campus carry in place at the University of 
Oregon System (OUS) violated state law.77 In particular, the court ruled that OUS lacked 
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authority to implement such a ban, much like the court proceedings in Colorado.78 
Although the ruling was not appealed, in 2012 the Oregon State Board of Higher 
Education moved in spite of the ruling and “unanimously approved a policy banning guns 
from classrooms, buildings, dormitories, and events”79. The UT-Austin Campus Carry 
Working Group notes that “the state of the law in Oregon is not particularly clear.”80 It is 
worth noting that Umpqua Community College, which experienced a mass shooting in 
2015, did not allow concealed handguns at the time of that tragic event81.  
In 2014, Kansas passed campus carry via legislation with HB 2052, making the 
effective date January 1, 2014.82 However, a provision of the law allowed each institution 
to request waivers of exemption from the practice for up to four years. As of August 
2013, affected campuses appeared to be using these waivers universally83, and the UT-
Austin Campus Carry Working Group suggested this continued to be the case in 2015.84  
In 2014, Idaho passed campus carry via legislation with SB 1254, making the law 
effective on July 1, 2014.85 Like Mississippi, Idaho law requires an “enhanced” permit in 
order to concealed carry on public colleges and universities.86 The law also “prohibits 
handgun carrying in dormitories and residence halls and in public entertainment facilities 
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that seat at least one thousand persons”, according to the UT-Austin Campus Carry 
Working Group.87 
With regard to Texas, it should be noted that the concealed carry of handguns has 
been legal on the actual grounds of public campuses since 1995, but not in other settings, 
such as buildings, dorms, event centers, and so forth.88 This changed in 2015 when the 
Texas legislature passed SB11, setting the effective date for a more permissive campus 
carry in August 2016.89 The legislation allows for each public college and university to 
devise its own implementation approach, as long as the creation of carve out areas does 
not amount to banning guns90 across campus.91 In its official report to UT-Austin 
President Gregory Fenves, the UT-Austin Campus Carry Working Group recommended 
designating certain areas, such as the majority of student housing and athletic events, off-
limit to concealed carry.92 The Working Group did not include classrooms in its list of 
off-limit areas, claiming that a ban in these locations would violate SB 11.93 President 
Fenves officially endorsed these recommendations on February 17, 2016, publishing a 
policy document with twenty-five “statements” outlining the details of the 
implementation strategy.94 The deliberative process is still under way for many other 
Texas public institutions as of the time of this writing.  
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SIGNIFICANCE OF POLICY CHANGES 
 
Passage of campus carry policies represent significant change in protocol for 
higher education institutions. Before the policy, individuals could not legally possess 
handguns in these settings, excluding qualified law enforcement officers. After 
implementation of the policy, campuses must allow for the legal carry of handguns by 
concealed handgun license holders, with the exception of the caveats discussed above.  
In order to obtain a license, individuals must be above a certain age (typically 21), 
pass a criminal background check, receive a small amount of training from a certified 
instructor, and demonstrate minimal proficiency with a handgun.95 After the effective 
dates of campus carry legislation, all active license holders are allowed to legally carry 
concealed handguns on certain parts of public college and university campuses - with the 
exception of Mississippi and Idaho, where an “enhanced” permit is also required. Thus, 
in Texas, all 937,419 license holders (as of December 2015) registered within the state 
could, in theory, carry concealed handguns throughout many portions of public campuses 
in the state, pending any last minute changes in implementation of the campus carry law - 
SB 11.96 Individuals carrying handguns on campuses must keep the handgun hidden from 
the view of others, and may only lawfully display a handgun in response to an action that 
requires justifiable use of self-defense.  
Notably, the actual prevalence of concealed carry on existing campus carry states 
is not well researched. The number of concealed carriers on campus is, based on current 
state laws, likely to be small as a percentage of an overall campus community. According 
to the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, all eight campus carry states require a 
concealed handgun licensee to be 21 years of age or older, meaning the entirety of a 
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student body is not eligible to carry.97 When the UT-Austin Campus Carry Working 
Group attempted to estimate the number of eligible concealed carriers in the university 
community, it noted that “less than one percent of [UT-Austin] students will have a 
license to carry a handgun.”98 This calculation was based on both the student age profile 
of the University and extrapolations of total statewide licensing rates to the college-aged 
demographic. The Working Group declined to estimate the percentage of faculty and 
staff with licenses at UT-Austin, but noted that this percentage was likely to be similarly 
low.99 Of the campus members eligible to carry concealed in Texas, it is also unclear how 
many would actually be motivated to do so. The limited empirical research conducted on 
this subject has been unable to provide definitive estimations on the number of 
individuals likely to act on their concealed carry eligibility.100   
In summary, as of the time of this report, campus carry policies have been passed 
in eight different states. These policies were enacted at different times and with differing 
on-the-ground implementation strategies. The policy of campus carry represents a 
significant departure from the historical norms applied within higher education settings, 
although these changes are unlikely to produce significant numbers of concealed carriers 
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relative to total campus populations. Importantly, the question of whether low rates of 
concealed carry are capable of producing significant changes in campus crime rates is 
currently unanswered. To better introduce my approach to addressing this question, I 




Chapter 3:  Related Literature 
 
The literature most closely related to this report focuses on the relationship 
between concealed carry policies and crime rates in the wider public domain. In 
particular, most researchers have attempted to assess the impact of right to carry (RTC) 
laws on rates of violent crime committed at the county-level.  
In perhaps the most seminal analysis within this literature, John Lott’s 1998 study 
examined FBI crime data on all 3,041 United States counties from 1977 to 1992, using 
regression techniques to model the impact of “shall-issue” RTC laws on rates of violent 
crime.101 Lott reported in More Guns, Less Crime that adoption of “shall-issue” RTC laws 
were associated with “[reduction in] murders by 8.5%, rapes by 5%, aggravated assaults 
by 7%, and robbery by 3%.”102 Lott has since updated his analysis, adding data up to 
2005 in his statistical models, and continues to report similar findings.103  
Lott’s analysis spurred significant controversy within the larger field of public 
policy and criminology. In 2004, The National Research Council (NRC) - convened by 
the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine - created a sixteen 
member expert panel to, among other firearm-related inquiries, review the credibility of 
Lott’s statistical methods.104 The panel concluded that, in spite of Lott’s claims, “there is 
no credible evidence that ‘right-to-carry’ laws, which allow qualified adults to carry 
concealed handguns, either decrease or increase violent crime.”105 One member of the 
assembled review panel dissented, asserting that Lott’s analysis was robust enough to 
demonstrate crime decreases in counties with RTC laws. Nevertheless, Lott’s analyses 
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are widely considered to be debunked on the grounds of poor methodology within the 
academic community.  
Lott’s analysis generated considerable attention on the impact of concealed 
carrying. More recently, a 2014 working paper issued by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) purported to show that “shall-issue” RTC laws were, in fact, 
actually associated with increases in violent crime.106 In the study, Donahue, Zheng, and 
Aneja analyzed FBI data on county-level crime across the country from 1979 to 2010. 
Results of the study suggested that counties within RTC states observed increases in 
aggravated assault by eight percent compared to their non-RTC counterparts, while 
seeing no reductions in other types of violent crime. These results stand in direct contrast 
to those of Lott’s analysis. The differences in these studies largely emanate from 
technical differences in methodology, which are beyond the purview of this report. 
Another 2015 analysis conducted by the Texas A&M School of Public Health 
attempted to assess whether increases in issuance of concealed handgun licenses affected 
crime at the county level.107 The study collected records on the number of licenses from 
1998 to 2010 from 385 different counties across four states. Using time-lagged regression 
models, the study authors estimated the impact of licensing rates on murder, rape, 
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft in these counties 
over the 1998 to 2010 period. The results of the study showed no evidence that license 
issuance caused downstream impacts, either positive or negative, on the rate of crime 
committed within a county. 
The reader should note that these analyses, which are largely representative of the 
pre-existing statistical modeling concerning concealed handguns over the past two 
decades, do not discuss campus carry specifically. Instead, they discuss the carrying of 
concealed handguns in public generally. The few studies that do attempt to examine the 
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 A. Aneja, J. J. Donohue, and A. Zhang, “The Impact of Right-to-Carry Laws and the NRC Report: 
Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy,” American Law and Economics Review 13, no. 2 
(September 1, 2011), doi:10.1093/aler/ahr009. 
107
 Charles D. Phillips et al., “Concealed Handgun Licensing and Crime in Four States,” Journal of 
Criminology 2015 (2015), doi:10.1155/2015/803742. 
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association between campus carry and crime are less robust than those discussed above. 
For example, a 2012 analysis conducted by the Cato Institute pointed to a correlation 
between the implementation of campus carry and decreased rates of crime at one 
Colorado public college.108 On the other hand, a 2015 analysis conducted by The 
Campaign to Keep Guns Off Campus purported to show an increase in rates of sexual 
assaults on campuses in Utah and Colorado - states that have implemented campus carry 
in public colleges and universities.109 Neither of these analyses, however, compared 
changes in crime rates relative to campuses without concealed carry policies or attempted 
to control for confounding influence through regression analysis. As such, the few efforts 
that have specifically focused on the impact of campus carry laws have apparently not 
progressed beyond partisan narratives merely pointing to correlations, and the dominant 
econometric literature has focused at a level beyond the campus.  
I attempt to address the paucity of study on the association between campus carry 
and campus crime by examining historical crime data at the campus level across all states 
- with and without campus carry. I use ordinary least squares (OLS) and negative 
binomial regression techniques, with and without time lag specifications, to control for 
the influence of confounding factors. My report therefore asks the question: “Controlling 
for certain factors that may influence crime, how have crime rates on campus changed 
when states have implemented campus carry policies relative to those campuses that have 
not?” The competing intellectual perspectives discussed above have different theoretical 
expectations for such an analysis. The conservative perspective suggests that campus 
carry should decrease rates of crime through a deterrent effect. On the other hand, the 
progressive perspective suggests that the policy either has no true bearing on crime 
because other fundamental concepts (such as total supply and ease of access to firearms) 
are more determinative, or that it may actually increase crime by providing an enabling 
effect for criminals. 
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 David Burnett and Cramer Clayton, Tough Targets. 
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 “The Campaign to Keep Guns Off Campus’ New Study Shows That on-Campus Crime Rates Have 
Increased in Two States Where Concealed Carry on Campus Is Allowed,” Campaign to Keep Guns Off 
Campus. 
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Chapter 4:  Data 
DATA SOURCE 
 
A robust focus on the campus crime is made possible by the Clery Act, which 
dramatically improved the way campuses report crime to the federal government in the 
1990s. According to the Clery Act, all higher education institutions receiving federal 
financial aid must disclose reported crime counts, measured on the calendar year, to the 
Department of Education (ED).110 Thus, I obtain information on campus crime 
committed in all fifty states from 2001 to 2014 through records provided by the ED. 
Reported crimes include aggravated assault, forcible sexual assault111, robbery, burglary, 
and motor vehicle theft.112 The ED records denote reported crime committed on each 
campus in each state by crime type, providing the unit analysis of campus/state/year. The 
ED data also offer total campus enrollment in each year, allowing rate calculations for 
each crime variable in each campus in each year. All data are publicly available through 
the “Campus Safety and Security Data Analysis Cutting Tool” provided by the ED113  
Crime records are available from this tool on different types of institutions. They 
are classified as: “Public, 4-year or above”; “Private nonprofit, 4-year or above”; “Private 
for-profit, 4-year or above”; “Public, 2-year”; “Private nonprofit, 2-year”; “Private for-
profit, 2-year”; “Public, less-than-2-year”; “Private nonprofit, less-than-2-year”; and 
“Private for-profit, less-than-2-year”. To control for the possibility of variations between 
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 Diane Ward and Janice Mann, The Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting, U.S. 
Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, 2011, 
http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/handbook.pdf. 
111 Starting 2014, the ED data set records forcible sexual assaults into the more precise categories of “rape” 
and “fondling”. In order to make the 2014 year comparable to previous years, I re-combine these two sub-
categories back into the single forcible sexual assault variable used in preceding years. 
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 The ED data set also contains information on non-negligent murder, negligent manslaughter, non-
forcible sexual offenses, and arson. I exclude non-negligent murder and negligent manslaughter from the 
analysis on the basis that all model estimations using these dependent variables fail F-tests. I also exclude 
arson and non-forcible sexual offenses (which ED defines as incest and statutory rape) on the basis that I 
lack a coherent theory to connect the frequency of these incidents to the availability of handguns. 
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 “The Campus Safety and Security Data Analysis Cutting Tool,” U.S. Department of Education, 
accessed October 15, 2015, http://ope.ed.gov/security/. 
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these institution types that may influence crime, I restrict my analysis to include only 
campuses that are classified as “Public, 4-year or above” and “Private nonprofit, 4-year 
or above.”114 The difference between these two types of higher education institutions 
provides an important source of exogenous variation in my empirical strategy. 
Specifically, private institutions are allowed to opt-out of campus carry in the affected 
states, while public institutions are not. Of these two institution types, I restrict campuses 
to those within US states in order to exclude international campuses, which are not 
subject to the campus carry laws under consideration. Finally, I restrict recorded crimes 
to those committed directly in settings listed as “on-campus property.”115  
 The initial data set contains 45,702 observations. I drop 6,602 observations that I 
determine to be graduate, professional, or vocational schools on the basis that these 
institutions may be systematically different from traditional four-year undergraduate 
programs in ways that influence crime rates (See Technical Appendix “Note 1” for more 
discussion).  
 I make another technical adjustment to ensure each observation refers to a 
regional campus (in some cases aggregating localized areas into a single observation), 
thereby reducing the number of observations by 12,271 (see Technical Appendix “Note 
2” for more detail on this procedure). Each observation therefore represents a campus of 
a higher education institution. For example, in each year, the Austin campus at the 
University of Texas is recorded separately from the Dallas campus, the Fairbanks campus 
at the University of Alaska is recorded separately from the Anchorage campus, and so 
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 Astute analysts may note that many of the campuses subject to concealed carry legislation are two-year 
community colleges. I anticipate that two-year and four-year colleges may have different relationships with 
crime rates at a systematic level that I may be unable to properly control for. As such, I decline to include 
these as observations in my analysis in order to study as uniform a sample as possible, and leave an 
investigation on two-year campuses for future research.  
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 The ED provides the following definition of “on-campus property”: 
“Under Clery [Act], the on-campus category encompasses the following: Any building or property owned 
or controlled by an institution within the same reasonably contiguous geographic area and used by the 
institution in direct support of, or in a manner related to, the institution’s educational purposes, including 
residence halls; and, Any building or property that is within or reasonably contiguous to paragraph (1) of 
this definition, that is owned by the institution but controlled by another person, is frequently used by 
students, and supports institutional purposes (such as a food or other retail vendor).” 
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forth. Institutions with only a single campus are recorded as a single observation in every 
year.  
 I further restrict the sample on the basis of size in order to operationalize my 
theory of what a “campus” means. Specifically, at this point in the data management 
process, there are 3,388 observations with less than 500 students. Many of these 
observations represent unconventional programs, such as a laboratory centers, art 
programs, and small theological programs, which may not have physical areas that 
conform to the traditional university or college campus.116 Moreover, these institutions 
often have vastly inflated crime rates due to small denominators in the rate 
calculations.117 As such, although it is ultimately an arbitrary cut off point, I drop 
observations with fewer than 500 students in order to preserve the integrity of the 
“campus” definition and prevent outliers from entering the statistical models. Finally, I 
drop an additional 106 observations that do not include student enrollment information, 
resulting in a final data set with n = 23,335.  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND GENERAL DATA TRENDS 
 
 The resulting data is summarized with crime statistics in the following manner: 
undifferentiated crime statistics (e.g. aggregate level) in Table 2; by private schools in 
Table 3; by public schools in Table 4; private schools by year in Table 5; public schools 
by year in Table 6; campus carry states in Table 7; non-campus carry states in Table 8; 
campus carry states by year in Table 9; and non-campus carry states by year in 2010.  
 In every way the data are broken out, a high number of observations for each 
variable are zero. For example, the percentage of observations that are zero for robbery in 
                                                 
116 For example, these small observations in the data set may not be congruent with the traditional notion 
of what a “campus” means. They may be a single floor level within a building, rather than a traditional 
college campus.   
117
 Including these observations often creates enormous outliers. For example, in 2001 “The Colorado 
Center for Medical Laboratory Science” had a student enrollment of 18 and a total robbery count of 123, 
creating a robbery rate of 73,333 per 10,000 enrolled students.  
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Table 2:  Aggregate Descriptive Statistics – Not by Any Group118 
 
(Units are crimes per 10,000 students) 
 
 




                                                 
118 Note that aggravated assault does not include negligent or non-negligent murder. These two categories of crime are not included in the descriptive 
statistics because I do not analyze them in my statistical models.  
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Table 3:  Aggregate Descriptive Statistics – Private Schools 
 
(Units are crimes per 10,000 students) 
Table 4:  Aggregate Descriptive Statistics – Public Schools 
 
(Units are crimes per 10,000 students) 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics by Year – Private Schools 
 
(Units are crimes per 10,000 students. The median for aggravated assault, robbery, and motor theft is zero throughout each 
year for private schools, reflecting the large number of zeros in the data set. Percentage of observations that are zero are 





Table 6:  Descriptive Statistics by Year – Public Schools 
 
(Units are crimes per 10,000 students. Unlike private schools, only the median for robbery is zero throughout each year in 
public schools. These observations are still largely comprised of zeros, so again percentage of observations that are zero are 
reported instead of median values.) 
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private schools are between eighty-three and eighty-five percent throughout the time 
series (Table 5). This number fluctuates from sixty-four to sixty-seven percent in public 
schools (Table 6). Reflecting this, median values are mostly zero throughout the 
descriptive statistics. Therefore, I often report the percentage of observations that are zero 
instead of median values. Furthermore, standard deviation is universally larger than 
variable mean for each type of crime in each year, suggesting a high level of variation in 
crimes even within the same year and the same type of school. The combination of high 
percentage zeros and highly dispersed data may justify a negative binomial regression as 
a robustness check to my main OLS approach; I turn to this check in a subsequent 
section.   
 Before beginning the regression analysis, it may be worth examining differences 
across the types of units observed (e.g. public vs. private, and campus carry state vs. non-
campus carry state). Turning first to the distinction across school types, an interesting 
distinction between private and public schools emerges in the descriptive statistics. On a 
percentage basis, private schools report zero incidents of crime more often in the data set 
than public schools, on both aggregate levels and throughout the time series. Indeed, for 
every type of crime, a higher share of private schools report no incidents when compared 
to public schools. For example, using the aggregate-level statistics by school type in 
Table 3 and Table 4, of the 14,183 observations pertaining to private schools, 70.92% of 
this number reported no incidents of aggravated assault. Of the 9,152 observations 
pertaining to public schools, only 49.45% reported no such incidents. This suggests that, 
for any number of reasons, a given private school is more likely to be a crime-free zone 
than a given public school.  
 However, closer analysis shows that the mean values of crime for private schools 
appear to be universally higher than mean crime values for public schools, both when 
compared by aggregate and throughout the time series. This is likely a product of the 
disparity between maximum observed values across school types. Maximum values for 
each crime variable are considerably higher for private schools when compared to 
maximum values for public school, thus pulling the private school mean upward. For 
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example, the highest rate of sexual assault for public schools throughout the time series 
was sixty-three per 10,000 enrolled students, while the highest rate of this type of crime 
for private schools was an astonishing 580 per 10,000. This is perhaps a reflection of a 
number of different factors. For example, differences in maximum values across school 
types may be the result of stronger reporting in private schools; perhaps the incidence of 
sexual assault is not truly higher on these campuses, but rather reported more often. 
Another potential explanation may be that private schools occasionally represent 
concentrated bodies of students from disadvantaged backgrounds, locate in areas that 
represent economic disadvantage, or lack significant funding to invest in campus safety. 
Supporting this theory is the fact that the maximum values for aggravated assault (St. 
Paul’s College, 2004), robbery (St. Paul’s College, 2004), and burglary (Talladega 
College, 2001) all come from private, historically African American colleges. Public 
schools, on the other hand, are typically larger bodies of heterogeneous student 
populations that receive considerable investment from the state. Finally, it may be that 
transforming discrete incidents of crime to rates of crime is simply an imperfect method 
of standardizing variable values across school types. Indeed, it may be the case that a 
certain number of crimes are likely to happen on any college campus. If this is true, then 
public schools, which typically have large student populations (and thus large 
denominators in rate calculations), would see the benefit of a diluted crime rate simply by 
virtue of their size. In any case, there do appear to be potential differences across school 
types, pointing to the importance of controlling for these differences in regression 
analysis. 
 Using Table 5 and Table 6, public and private schools seem to display the same 
general trends across the time series, with some small exceptions.119 The means for 
aggravated assault and motor theft are noticeably decreasing over the 2001 to 2014 
period for both school types (with percentage of campuses reporting zero of these 
incidents increasing), while the mean for sexual assault is noticeably increasing (with 
                                                 
119 The reader should note that I do not support these claims by conducting statistical tests (e.g. on whether 
there is actually a difference between mean values across 2001 to 2014), instead relying only a visual 
assessment of the trends in Table 4 and Table 5. 
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percentage of campuses reporting zero decreasing). Although the mean for robbery is 
down for both groups, the percentage of campuses reporting zero robberies is marginally 
up for private schools (83.09% to 85.31%), and marginally down for public schools 
(67.85% to 64.67%). This suggests that while the number of robberies may be down over 
both groups, the experience of robbery may be increasingly common at public schools, 
and less so at private schools. Again, however, these changes across the time series are 
marginal for both groups, and these differences may be random and not truly different 
from zero. Finally, the mean for burglary is also down for both groups, but the percentage 
of campuses reporting zero burglaries is up for private schools (23.04% to 29.29%), and 
almost unchanged for public schools (19.23% to 18.87%). The caveat should again be 
noted that standard deviation is high compared to the mean throughout the data set, and 
these descriptive statistics are the aggregation of considerable variation. 
 It may also be worthwhile to examine the differences across campus carry versus 
non-campus carry states. Campus carry states include those that ever passed a version of 
the policy in the 2001 to 2014 period (e.g. Utah, Colorado, Oregon, Wisconsin, 
Mississippi, Idaho, and Kansas); non-campus carry states include the remaining forty-
three states that did not pass the policy during this time period (including Texas, which 
passed the law in 2015).120 Unfortunately, because campus carry becomes active in those 
seven states at different times, there is not a point in the descriptive statistics that suggests 
a clear pre / post transition. The intervention in question occurs at different times within 
the campus carry state group. Therefore, gauging the impact of campus carry is not as 
simple as observing how crime rates change across campus carry states as a group 
compared to non-campus carry states as a group. Exploring differences across these 
groups may still be illuminating. 
                                                 
120 Note that, as previously discussed, Kansas, Oregon, and Wisconsin do not implement campus carry in 
the same permissive way that Colorado, Utah, Mississippi, and Idaho do. I include all of these states within 
the “campus carry” group in an attempt to illustrate whether there are substantial differences between states 
that pass the policy and those that have not. In the statistical models ahead, however, I only assign 
treatment effects to states that have technically implemented campus carry in a de facto manner for which 
time series data is also available (e.g. Colorado, Utah, and Mississippi).  
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Table 7:  Aggregate Descriptive Statistics – Campus Carry States 
 
(Units are crimes per 10,000 students. Observations include institutions that are located within states that were campus carry states at 
any time in the 2001 to 2014 period. This excludes observations from Texas, which pass SB 11 in 2015.) 
Table 8.    Aggregate Descriptive Statistics – Non-Campus Carry States 
 
(Units are crimes per 10,000 students. Observations include institutions that are located within states that were campus carry states at 
any time from the 2001 to 2014 time period. This excludes observations from Texas as well.) 
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics by Year – Campus Carry States 
 








Table 10: Descriptive Statistics by Year – Non-Campus Carry States 
 
(Units are crimes per 10,000 students. Percentage of observations that are zero are reported instead of median values.
 42 
 In the aggregate statistics provided by Table 7 and Table 8, campus carry states 
seem to have a slightly lower rate of aggravated assault (1.627 per 10,000 enrolled 
students) compared to non-campus carry states (2.743 per 10,000) with a comparable 
difference in percentage zero (66.33% compared to 62.18%, respectively). Campus carry 
states seem to have lower aggregate rates of robbery (0.987 per 10,000) compared to non-
campus carry states as well (1.216 per 10,000), again with similar differences across 
percentage zero (81.63% compared to 75.31%, respectively). Both mean and percentage 
zero for sexual assault are nearly the same across both groups the aggregate level. 
Finally, the mean for burglary is very similar across groups (25.224 per 10,000 for 
campus carry states, compared to 29.330 per 10,000 for non-campus carry states), with 
almost identical percentage zero (19.88% compared to 20.85%, respectively). Again, I do 
not conduct statistical tests of significance on these differences. But, importantly, any 
significant differences across these groups that do exist may be a difference not due to 
campus carry, but rather to inherent differences across these states in other factors that 
influence crime. I reiterate this point in discussing my empirical methodology in the next 
section.  
 Using Table 9 and Table 10, campus carry and non-campus carry states generally 
experience the same time trends. Aggravated assault and motor theft are down across 
campuses in all states in the 2001 to 2014 period (with corresponding increases in 
percentage zero), reflecting a nationwide decrease in these types of crime, while sexual 
assault is increasing across all states (with a corresponding decrease in percentage zero). 
The mean for burglary is down for both types of states, though campus carry states 
experienced a considerable increase in the number of campuses reporting zero burglaries 
(14.40% to 32.33%), while non-campus carry states only experienced a very marginal 
increase in this measure (22.11% to 24.54%). Finally, the mean for robbery is also down 
for both types of states, but the percentage reporting no incidents in non-campus carry 
states is almost unchanged (76.62% to 76.95%), while this number is slightly down in 
campus carry states (82.40 to 80.45%). These trends suggest that any changes in crime 
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due to campus carry must be parsed out of natural changes across the nation simply due 
to the progression of time.  
NOTEWORTHY LIMITATIONS 
 
 A number of important limitations are worth noting in the ED data. Perhaps most 
importantly, the number of observations with treatment effects is quite small. There a 
total of 144 treatment observations (e.g. public campuses in campus carry states in post-
implementation time periods). This number amounts to 0.617% of the total data set. 
 Also, in accordance with the Clery Act, the data collected by the ED reflect 
reported crime, not actual convictions for criminal offenses. Reports in the ED data may 
therefore not always result in a one-for-one ratio of conviction, as some offenses may 
ultimately be cleared in court. In such a scenario, the data set would over-report crime 
statistics. In perhaps a more likely alternative case, it is conceivable that students may fail 
to report incidents of crime, or police may fail to properly document them. This kind of 
under-reporting is almost certainly at play; the Bureau of Justice Statistics noted in 2014 
that only twenty percent of total sexual assaults against students were reported to police 
from 2000 to 2013.121 It is therefore at least somewhat uncertain whether the ED data 
accurately represents the reality of campus crime, whether due to over or under-reporting.  
 Another noteworthy issue is the fact that the data set aggregates crimes on the 
calendar year, but campus carry policies mostly become effective starting in August to 
reflect the beginning of the new school year. I attempt a minor technical adjustment in the 
statistical models to account for this difference across recording periods (see Technical 
Appendix “Note 3” for details).  
 Also, given the 2001 to 2014 time frame, it is impossible to estimate treatment 
effects for Texas, which passed SB 11 in 2015. Similarly, Idaho’s implementation of SB 
1254 in 2014 provides only a half year of treatment data. As such, there is not enough 
data in the time series to observe treatment effects in these states. Although the above 
                                                 
121 Lynn Langton and Sofi Sinozich, Rape and Sexual Assault Victimization Among College-Age Females. 
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factors represent a degree of methodological weakness, I believe the extensive nature of 
the data source justifies proceeding with the analysis. 
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Chapter 5:  Empirical Methodology 
DEVELOPING THE ECONOMETRIC LOGIC  
 
 The empirical portion of my report is based on a quasi-experimental analysis of 
campus carry policies. The passage of these policies 1) in public but not private 
institutions, 2) in some states but not others, and 3) across a time series provides a sort of 
natural experiment to examine the impact of the law. Here, I develop the logic of the 
modeling process that incorporates these three sources of variation.  
 The simplest econometric approach that might be used to evaluate the impact of 
campus carry on crime would be a regression model incorporating a single dummy 
variable and a vector of other relevant control variables:  
 
1) Y = α0  +  δ1D   +  ΣθkX  +   ε 
 
In Equation 1, the dummy variable, D, becomes active for observations that refer to 
campus carry institutions, and turns off for all other observations. In this model (and in 
the actual estimations I perform below), the vector X includes a control for student 
enrollment in addition to state and time fixed effects.122 In such a model, the conservative 
perspective suggests that the coefficient of interest, δ1, should be significant and negative; 
that is, institutions with campus carry should see decreased crime due to deterrence of 
criminal activity. Progressives who believe the policy enables criminal activity suggest 
that this coefficient should be significant and positive.  
 However, this modeling approach does not account for the fact that there may be 
systematic differences between the institutions implementing campus carry and those that 
do not. In particular, this model does not account for the fact that all campus carry 
                                                 
122
 Ideally, other control variables that may also predict crime rates should be included in this vector, such 
as local economic conditions, gun ownership rates, rates of concealed carry, and factors that measure the 
urban-ness of the institution’s surroundings, such as population density. Unfortunately, the data set I use 
does not have information on these potential covariates. Hence, my emphasis that the results of this report 
should be considered preliminary.  
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institutions are public schools, which may have crime rates that are affected by cultural or 
behavioral differences in the student population inherent to these types of schools. In 
such a case, δ1 is potentially entangled with other factors that predict crime rates through 
a selection bias. Significance in the δ1 coefficient could simply be the product of 
unaccounted differences unique to public schools. For this reason, the simple 
econometric model may be inappropriate for gauging the impact of campus carry.  
 As such, the model should factor in differences across institutions to prevent 
confounding. The difference in differences design becomes an appropriate econometric 
approach here. In this design, private institutions, which can opt out of campus carry, 
function as the control group and public institutions function as the treatment group. This 
approach allows time trends that impact crime rates across both treatment and control 
(e.g. fluctuations in the state economy, etc.) to be controlled for and differences across 
campus types (e.g. cultural differences) to be captured as well. Treatment effects can then 
be observed by the difference in crime rates across treatment and control institutions: 
 
2) Y = α0 + B1Type + B2Post + δ1(Type x Post) + ΣθkX  +   ε 
 
In Equation 2, the dummy variable Type turns on for public campuses and the dummy 
variable Post turns on for observations in the post-passage period. The single interaction 
variable Type x Post therefore turns on for public campuses in the post-passage period. 
Thus the coefficient of interest, δ1, theoretically measures the impact of campus carry 
legislation, factoring in differences across institution types. Again, the conservative 
perspective theorizes that δ1 is significant and negative. 
 However, Equation 2 makes an important identification assumption: that crime 
trends are not systematically different in states with campus carry compared to states 
without the policy. There are many factors that may weaken the validity of this 
assumption. For example, it may be that in addition to passing campus carry, Utah, 
Colorado, Mississippi, and the remaining campus carry states also have different 
economic, cultural, or demographic factors that serve as the true underlying source of 
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variation in campus crime rates. In such a case, the results of Equation 2 would be 
misleading, potentially pointing to the influence of factors unique to these observations at 
the state level other than the legislation itself. Therefore, in order to account for factors 
that may be unique to campus carry states, the model should also include observations 
from non-campus carry states as well. Another treatment / control dynamic is leveraged 
into the model by adding in difference between states with and without the policy through 
a Treat variable. Incorporating this additional dynamic results in the triple difference 
approach. 
THE TRIPLE DIFFERENCE APPROACH  
 
 To reiterate, variability inherent to the policy creates a way to observe potential 
differences in crime rates 1) across public and private institutions, 2) across pre/post 
passage periods, and 3) across state lines where the policy is and is not present. Passage 
of campus carry could be considered a type of natural experiment, accounted for in the 
following triple difference model: 
 
3) Yijt = α0 + B1Treatj   +   B2Postt   +   B3Typei   +   γ1(Treatj x Postt)   +    
 
γ2(Treatj x Typei)  +  γ3(Typei x Postt)  +  δ1(Treatj x Typei x Postt)   +  ΣθkXijt     +     εijt 
 
In Equation 3, subscript i refers to campus, j refers to state, and t refers to time period 
correlating to pre/post legislative passage. The Type and Post variables are as described 
above. The added dummy variable Treat turns on for observations within states that pass 
the policy at any point in the 2001 to 2014 time series (e.g. campuses that are eventually 
subject to the policy). The un-interacted variables in Equation 3 may be interpreted in the 
following manner:  
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 B1 on Treatj measures systematic differences in crime rates between campus carry 
and non-campus carry states;123  
 B2 on Postt measures differences inherent to the before and after period not 
attributable to the policy; 
 B3 on Typei measures systematic differences in public and private schools.  
 
 The two-way interaction terms in Equation 3 are somewhat more complicated in 
their interpretations: 
 
 γ1 on Treatj x Postt parses out variation in crime unique to campus carry states in 
the post-passage period. This term accounts for the possibility that there may be 
unrelated crime shocks specific to these states after the policy is passed; 
 γ2 on Treatj x Typei absorbs variation due specifically to public institutions in 
campus carry states. This term accounts for the fact that, for example, public 
institutions in Utah and Mississippi may be systematically different compared to 
institutions in other states in ways the influence crime; 
 γ3 on Typei x Postt absorbs variation due specifically to public institutions in post-
passage time periods. This term accounts for the possibility that there may be 
crime shocks specific to public institutions unrelated to campus carry after the 
policy is passed.  
 
 Finally, the variable of interest in Equation 3 is the three-way interaction term, 
which may be interpreted as follows: 
 
 δ1 on Treatj x Typei x Postt measures the impact on crime rates experienced by 
public campuses that are located within campus carry states in the post-passage 
period. This coefficient measures change in crime compared to the “base” case 
                                                 
123 The Treatj variable is actually collinear with other fixed effects in this model. It is included as a 
heuristic device here, but excluded from the actual model estimations below.  
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(e.g. institutions that do not have the policy active, either because they are in a 
control state, they are a private school, or they are in the pre-implementation 
period).  
 
 The triple difference method is therefore more robust to potentially confounding 
influence of extraneous factors influencing crime rates than the simpler models discussed 
previously. For this reason, I believe it is a superior modeling approach. Once more, the 
conservative perspective suggests that the variable of interest, δ1, is negative.  
 Importantly, however, the standard triple difference model above assumes a single 
transition from pre-passage to post-passage period. Unfortunately, this means the 
standard model does not lend itself to measuring the impact of campus carry without 
additional modification. As discussed earlier, campus carry policies were passed in a 
variety of different years among treatment states, meaning there is not a single pre / post 
transition that can be applied to the full sample of observations.124 In light of this, I 
attempt to estimate a triple difference model that is generalized to allow for policy 
implementation at various time periods. I take the generalized version of a difference in 
difference model as a starting point: 
 
4) Y = α0 + B1Treatment + ΣB2…15Year + δ1(Treat x Post) + ΣθkX  +   ε 
 
Instead of capturing the impact of crime due to a single before / after transition, the above 
model captures time-specific effects in every year (B2 to B15). Equation 2 and Equation 4 
both accomplish the desired goal of separating the effects of time from the effect of the 
difference in difference estimator. The advantage of Equation 4 is that it does not require 
that control observations be assigned to the Post period in any particular year, allowing 
for different policy intervention times.  
                                                 
124
 The significance of this difficulty might be clarified further. Utah passed campus carry in 2006, while 
Mississippi passed the policy in 2011. The question is then: when should the observations in non-campus 
carry states be assigned to the post period given that there is no uniform implementation year?  
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 From Equation 4, I attempt to extrapolate a generalized triple difference model 
with the following specification: 
 
5) Yijt = α0 + B1Treatj  +  B2Postt   +  B3Typei  + γ1(Treatj x Typei)  + 
 
Σγ2..15(Year x Treatj)  +  Σγ16...29(Year x Typei)  +  δ1(Treatj x Typei x Postt)   + 
 
ΣθkXijt    +   εijt 
 
In Equation 5, the single interaction terms that previously included Post are now replaced 
by year-specific interactions. The desired goal here is to separate out the effects due to 
the interaction between time and treatment state (γ2 to γ15) from the triple difference 
estimator, as well as to separate out effects due the interaction between time and campus 
type (γ16 to γ 29). The result is that the triple difference estimator, δ1, should measure 
changes in crime experienced by public schools in campus carry states without 
confounding influence from other interactions.125  
 Equation 5 assumes that the impact of campus carry is constant over time (e.g. δ1 
is a constant value whenever the dummy variable Treatj x Typei x Postt becomes active 
for an observation). As in Equation 3, the coefficient on the triple difference estimator, δ1, 
measures the change in crime on public campuses in campus carry states after the policy 
is active. According to the deterrence theory, would-be criminals should be deterred by 
the uncertainty inherent to targeting potentially armed individuals on campus and 
therefore choose to act in these settings less frequently. As above, this theory suggests 
that δ1 should be negative. 
 Finally, another adjustment might be made to anticipate the presence of serial 
autocorrelation in the data. Crime rates in one year may have considerable influence on 
crime rates in a subsequent year, and failing to account for such autocorrelation, in the 
event it is present, could result in biased coefficients. In order to test for this, I develop a 
                                                 
125
 This strategy is not without disadvantages. Degrees of freedom are lost by the inclusion of more 
variables. But, given 23,335 observations in the sample, this is ultimately a small compromise and the 
resulting increase in standard errors should be marginal. 
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final model that adds both a one year-lagged and two year-lagged dependent variable on 
the left-hand side of the equation: 
 
6) Yijt = α0 + Yijt-1 +  Yijt-2  +  B1Treatj   +  B2Postt   +  B3Typei  + γ1(Treatj x Typei)  +  
 
Σγ2..15(Year x Treatj)  + Σγ16...29(Year x Typei)  +  δ1(Treatj x Typei x Postt)   +  
 
  ΣθkXijt    +   εijt 
 
In Equation 6, any variation attributed to autocorrelation is parsed out from the triple 
difference estimator in the time lagged dependent variables, preserving the model from 
this potential bias.  
CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The lack of clarity in some state’s campus carry approaches means that critical 
assumptions must be made in the statistical modeling process. For example, it is 
somewhat unclear how treatment effects should be modeled in Kansas, Oregon, and 
Wisconsin. For example, even as the law technically became effective for Kansas in 
2014, each potentially affected campus in the state appears to have used the optional four 
year waiver to opt out of treatment. The same appears to be true of Wisconsin, as public 
colleges and universities have apparently universally used the provision that allows them 
to ban handguns from most areas of campus since the law’s passage in 2011. Oregon 
seems to have followed the Wisconsin approach as well, effectively banning handguns 
from most campus areas.  
Therefore, although there are eight de jure campus carry states, it appears that 
there are only five de facto campus carry states. Treatment effects cannot be observed in 
Texas and Idaho, however, because the data source I use does not extend past 2014. This 
leaves only three de facto campus carry states for which treatment effects can be 
modeled. Mississippi and Utah experience clear, all-at-once transitions from pre to post 
period that are captured in the data set. Colorado campuses apparently experienced 
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treatment effects at different times, with the CSU System allowing campus carry since 
2003, the CU System since 2012, and the remaining campuses since 2010.126 I attempt to 
incorporate these realities into the statistical modeling process in an appropriate manner, 
making my best judgments about how to assign treatment effects across these states 
based on the implementation approaches outlined above.  
 Another crucial assumption for this empirical strategy to be valid is that private 
schools do, in fact, universally opt out from campus carry when they are allowed to do 
so. After a relatively comprehensive investigation, I cannot find record of private 
institutions opting in to the policy.127 For example, as of March 10, 2016, the Texas 
Tribune notes that twenty-six out of thirty-eight private colleges have explicitly opted out 
of campus carry, with the remaining universities still deliberating.128 Commentary 
provided to The Texas Tribune seems to generally suggest these remaining institutions 
will opt out as well. 
                                                 
126
 These campus specific transitions for Colorado are coded appropriately into all statistical models.  
127
 The website www.armedcampuses.org provides the most comprehensive listing of institutions that 
currently allow campus carry, none of which include private schools. In 2012, researcher John Lott 
compiled a list of schools allowing campus carry, none of which included private schools, available at 
Lott’s personal blog: http://johnrlott.blogspot.com/2012/12/a-partial-list-of-206-college-campuses.html.  
128
 Jimmy Ellison, “Where Texas’ Private Universities Stand on Campus Carry,” The Texas Tribune, April 
1, 2016, http://apps.texastribune.org/private-university-campus-carry/. 
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Chapter 6:  Results 
PRIMARY OLS RESULTS 
 
 Given their potential deficiencies, I do not conduct regressions on Equations 1 
through 4, allowing them to simply develop the econometric logic. I focus on Equation 5 
(triple difference model) and Equation 6 (time-lagged triple difference model), first 
conducting regressions with these formulas on the full sample of observations (n = 
23,335). These regressions reflect the reality of campus carry to the best of my 
knowledge. That is, treatment effects are only assigned to campuses in Utah, Colorado, 
and Mississippi. Although observations in Kansas, Oregon, and Wisconsin are 
technically in campus carry states, I do not assign treatment effects to these observations 
in order to reflect the restrictive bans placed on concealed carrying on campus in these 
states (See Technical Appendix Note 4 for details). To rationalize this assumption, I point 
to the policies in Kansas, Oregon, and Wisconsin that severely restrict or create de facto 
bans on concealed carry throughout the majority of campus, as discussed above. 
Assigning treatment effects to observations in these states, in my opinion, would 
therefore improperly represent the reality of campus carry in these states. Finally, campus 
carry is not active for long enough in Idaho to allow for estimation of treatment effects 
(See Technical Appendix Note 2).  
 All models feature a vector of control variables that includes state and time fixed 
effects, in addition to size of student enrollment.129 Both Equation 5 and Equation 6 show 
no discernible change in any of the five types of crime rates. That is, models with and 
without time lags produce similar results suggesting no observable impact on crime rates 
due to campus carry. According to Table 11, a public institution in a campus carry state 
after the policy is active experiences a non-statistically significant decrease of 0.511 
aggravated assaults per 10,000 enrolled students compared to the “base” case. However, 
  
                                                 
129
 Regressions done in Stata 14.1 IC. Data set and .do file available by request from the author. 
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Table 11: OLS - Modeling Campus Carry Legislation, No Time-Lag Model130 
Equation 5: Yijt = …δ1 (Treatj x Typei x Postt) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)                
         Aggravated Assault  Sexual Assault    Robbery        Burglary      Motor theft 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
δ1             -0.511            0.229           0.396          -0.214           1.272           
              (0.594)          (1.478)         (0.589)         (5.685)         (0.851)         
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N             23335           23335           23335           23335           23335            
R-sq          0.030           0.078           0.012           0.098           0.075         
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All units are crimes per 10,000 students enrolled at an institution. Standard errors in 
parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All F-tests for model significance are 
highly significant (Prob > F 0.0000). All estimations include state and time fixed 
effects, and use white’s heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors.  
 
 
Table 12: OLS - Modeling Campus Carry Legislation, Time-Lag Model 
Equation 6: Yijt = Yijt-1 + Yijt-2… + δ1 (Treatj x Typei x Postt) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)                
         Aggravated Assault  Sexual Assault    Robbery        Burglary      Motor theft 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
δ1               -0.572             0.461            0.241           -2.385         -0.441           




Dependent    0.377***         0.436***    0.329***        0.518***       0.365*** 
Var      (0.0321)          (0.0594)    (0.0497)     (0.0213)     (0.0269) 
 
Twice-Lagged  
Dependent    0.155***         0.368***     0.0107           0.203***       0.202*** 
Var      (0.0371)          (0.0414)    (0.0361)     (0.0169)     (0.0244) 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N              19698           19698            19698           19698           19698            
R-sq           0.237           0.393            0.168           0.535           0.321             
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All units are crimes per 10,000 students enrolled at an institution. Standard errors in 
parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All F-tests for model significance are 
highly significant (Prob > F 0.0000). All estimations include state and time fixed 
effects, and use white’s heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. 
                                                 
130 For brevity, I omit reporting results for the many other variables in these models throughout the 
following tables, including state and time variables, primarily because these variables are not directly 
related to the policy question at hand.  
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Table 12 shows that accounting for the presence of serial autocorrelation in the data may 
be necessary. Every lagged dependent variable is highly significant (p<0.001), with the 
exception of the double lag for robbery. This suggests that, in most cases, crime rates of 
previous years have effects that are distributed at least two years into the future. 
Moreover, R2 values increase significantly when accounting for autocorrelation (in the 
case of aggravated assault, from 0.030 to 0.237), suggesting Equation 6 explains 
considerably more variation in crime rates. Importantly, the triple difference estimator, 
δ1, remains non-significant for every type of crime considered. The 95% confidence 
interval applies to all of these interpretations.  
 The results should be properly qualified in the context of the large standard errors 
in most estimations. For example, the standard error associated with aggravated assault in 
Table 11 (0.594) given the point estimate (-0.511) means that I can only conclude at the 
95% confidence interval that crime did not increase by more than 24% or decrease by 
more than 63% of the aggravated assault mean of the entire data sample (See Table 2: 
Mean of aggravated assault: 2.644) (See Technical Appendix Note 4 for more detail on 
this calculation). Thus, my analysis is incapable of concluding with a high degree of 
certainty that a change in crime did not happen within this relatively large margin of 
error. This is true in varying degrees for all the crime types considered (especially note 
the large standard errors on the triple difference coefficient for burglary).  
ROBUSTNESS CHECK: THROWING OUT UNCERTAIN STATES 
 
 Although I believe the above estimations best represent the reality of campus 
carry through the time series, I attempt a robustness check to evaluate the sensitivity of 
the models to different assumptions. As discussed earlier, there is considerable 
uncertainty about the on-the-ground reality of campus carry in Kansas, Oregon, and 
Wisconsin. I risk the chance of improperly representing observations in these states by 
including them as non-treatment states in the models. To test whether their inclusion  
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Table 13: OLS Robustness Check: Modeling Campus Carry Legislation Without KS, 
OR, WI, No Time-Lag Model 
Equation 5: Yijt = …δ1 (Treatj x Typei x Postt) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)                
         Aggravated Assault  Sexual Assault    Robbery        Burglary      Motor theft 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
δ1         1.119             0.565           -0.00628        1.894           2.144            
             (0.674)           (1.481)          (0.646)        (6.618)         (1.510)          
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N             22201             22201            22201          22201           22201 
R-sq          0.029             0.079            0.011          0.099           0.073              
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All units are crimes per 10,000 students enrolled at an institution. Standard errors in 
parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All F-tests for model significance are 
highly significant (Prob > F 0.0000). All estimations include state and time fixed 
effects, and use white’s heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. 
 
Table 14: OLS Robustness Check: Modeling Campus Carry Legislation Without KS, 
OR, WI, Time-Lag Model 
Equation 6: Yijt = Yijt-1 + Yijt-2… + δ1 (Treatj x Typei x Postt) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)                
         Aggravated Assault  Sexual Assault    Robbery        Burglary      Motor theft 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
δ1             -0.142           0.519          -0.307           -2.854          -0.906  
              (0.638)          (0.986)         (0.515)          (4.790)         (0.916)  
 
Once-Lagged 
Dependent     0.378***          0.423***       0.331***         0.523***    0.363*** 
Var            (0.0327)         (0.0588)        (0.0508)    (0.0222)    (0.0276) 
 
Twice-Lagged 
Dependent     0.153***          0.362***       0.00721         0.204***   0.206*** 
Var            (0.0380)         (0.0416)        (0.0360)    (0.0174)   (0.0256) 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N               18748           18748           18748           18748           18748            
R-sq            0.235           0.382           0.171           0.540           0.320         
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All units are crimes per 10,000 students enrolled at an institution. Standard errors in 
parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All F-tests for model significance are 
highly significant (Prob > F 0.0000). All estimations include state and time fixed 
effects, and use white’s heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. 
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changes results of the models, I throw out all observations in these three states from the 
sample and then estimate both Equation 5 and Equation 6 again. 
 The results of both Equation 5 and Equation 6 are generally the same when the 
uncertain states are thrown out from the sample. The coefficient for some coefficients 
switches signs between these two approaches (for example, aggravated assault switches 
signs to positive, between Table 11 and Table 13), suggesting at least some level of 
model sensitivity. Nevertheless, whether observations in the uncertain campus carry 
states are included or not in the regression analysis, none of the models achieve 
significance at the 95% confidence level. This is true even when serial autocorrelation is 
accounted for by the addition of time lag variables. Again, these lag variables remain 
highly significant (p<0.001), except for the second lag for robbery, which is again non-
significant. It is worth noting that standard errors are once again quite high relative to 
point estimates, reinforcing the inability of my models to make very precise conclusions 
about the impact campus carry. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK: NON-OLS MODELING APPROACH 
 
 Another potential issue with my primary empirical method may be that OLS 
regression is simply not an appropriate approach to modeling count data. My primary 
approach relies on transforming the ED data from discrete counts of crime occurrences 
into rates of crime per 10,000 students enrolled, and then applying OLS regressions on 
these rate variables. Another possible way to analyze the data set is to simply keep the 
dependent variables in count form and undertake regression analysis using the Poisson 
distribution. However, this approach assumes that an analyzed variable has equal values 
for conditional mean and variance. Crime variables in the ED data consistently have 
variance greater than the mean (See Tables 2 through 10), and are therefore likely over-
dispersed with respect to the Poisson distribution. As such, regression using the negative 
binomial distribution may be more appropriate. The negative binomial distribution adds 
an additional parameter compared to Poisson, allowing variance to be adjusted  
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Table 15. Negative Binomial Robustness Check: Modeling Campus Carry Legislation, 
No Time-Lag Model 
Equation 5: Yijt = …δ1 (Treatj x Typei x Postt) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)                
        Aggravated Assault  Sexual Assault    Robbery         Burglary      Motor theft    
    
δ1                                        -0.443          -0.420           0.597           0.131          -0.187  
               (0.435)         (0.227)         (0.409)         (0.199)         (0.316)  
 
            
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                23335          23335           23335           23335           23335    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All units are discrete counts of crime. Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All estimations return Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000. All estimations include 
state and time fixed effects, and use the vce(robust) option. 
 
 
Table 16. Negative Binomial Robustness Check: Modeling Campus Carry Legislation, 
Time-Lag Model 
Equation 6: Yijt = Yijt-1 + Yijt-2… + δ1 (Treatj x Typei x Postt) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)                
         Aggravated Assault  Sexual Assault    Robbery        Burglary      Motor theft 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 δ1              -0.596         -0.287         -0.200          0.0226         -0.342    
                (0.392)        (0.208)        (0.358)         (0.156)        (0.258)   
   
Once-Lagged 
Dependent       0.185***  0.150***  0.208***   0.0325***    0.0845*** 
Var  (0.00820) (0.00593)  (0.0114) (0.000997)  (0.00540) 
 
Twice-Lagged 
Dependent       0.0920***  0.103***  0.143***   0.0127***    0.0438*** 
Var  (0.00759) (0.00570)  (0.0113) (0.000834)  (0.00460) 
        
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                19698           19698           19698           19698           19698   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All units are discrete counts of crime. Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All estimations return Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000. All estimations include 
state and time fixed effects, and use the vce(robust) option.  
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independently of the variable mean. As such, I believe it is arguably the best non-OLS 
approach to modeling the data.  
 Thus, I apply negative binomial regression to both Equation 5 and Equation 6. 
Given the results of the first robustness check above, I perform these regressions under 
the most realistic campus carry assumptions: allowing Kansas, Oregon, and Wisconsin to 
remain in the sample, but assuming they are not treatment states given their very 
restrictive approaches to the law.131 
 From Table 15 and Table 16, the same general pattern of significance can be 
observed in the negative binomial regressions. Under both non-lagged and time-lagged 
models, non-OLS estimations continue to suggest that there is no observable change in 
crime rates after campus carry implementation that can be considered significant at the 
95% confidence interval. Across the negative binomial models, there is only minor 
inconsistency in coefficient signs; in particular, the triple difference estimator for robbery 
switches (to negative) for the time-lagged model, but again without obtaining 
significance. The triple difference coefficients for aggravated assault and sexual assault 
appear close to significance, but fail to achieve this threshold of certainty.  
GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF TIME TRENDS 
 
 A graphical analysis may also be useful to display any potential correlation 
between implementation of campus carry and changes in crime rates. As such, I graph 
time trends for each crime variable in the two states – Utah and Mississippi – that 
experienced all-at-once de facto treatment effects. These graphs allow for a visual, 
within-state comparison between crime trends in private (control group) and public 
(treatment group) campuses before and after campus carry implementation.  
 Figure 1 shows the trends in aggravated assault in public (red) and private (blue) 
campuses within Utah, with the policy implementation date denoted by a vertical line. 
                                                 
131 Though the results are unchanged again even when uncertain campus carry states are thrown out of the 
sample in the negative binomial approach. I do not include these results for brevity.  
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Points on the graph represent the average rate of a particular crime variable on public or 
private campuses across the state in a particular year. Immediately following 
implementation, public schools appear to experience a marginal increase in the average 
rate of aggravated assaults, while private schools experience a marginal decrease in this 
average rate. However, I do not use these graphs to conduct statistical analyses, and the 
aforementioned changes may not be statistically different from zero. Moreover, these 
trends gradually fluctuate over time, with subsequent increases and decreases in both 
types of schools. I include these illustrations to show that there are no clear before and 
after crime trends for schools that implement campus carry. Figures 2 through 10, 
available in the Appendix, provide similar results. All units for these graphs are crimes 
per 10,000 students enrolled.   
Figure 1: Time series of average rate of aggravated assault by public / private school 
in Utah 
 
(Units are aggravated assaults per 10,000 students) 
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Chapter 7:  Discussion 
RESULTS IN THE CONTEXT OF COMPETING PERSPECTIVES 
 
 The impact of concealed handgun carry policies on the safety of college and 
university campuses is an increasingly important topic. Between 2004 and 2015, eight 
states began implementing some version of the policy, though several states – including 
Kansas, Oregon, and Wisconsin – have restrictive and uncertain approaches to 
implementation of the law.  
 Generally, debates on campus carry may be seen as emerging from the larger 
context of a debate on gun rights in public spaces. Conservative advocates of the policy 
generally point to the possibility of a deterrence effect, which suggests that concealed 
handgun carriers provide a disincentive to offensive action by criminals. Progressive 
opponents contend that a larger determinant of crime rates is not campus carry, but rather 
the pre-existing stock of available firearms at large, and so the policy likely has no 
observable impact on crime. Other opponents of the law suggest that it may provide an 
enabling effect for criminals. Despite heated debate between these perspectives, the 
relationship between crime and concealed carry specifically within the campus 
environment has not been well evaluated in an empirical context before this report.  
 Variability inherent to campus carry policies across states, institution types, and 
times allows for a triple difference modeling approach – a kind of quasi-experimental 
analysis. This model is robust to the potential of confounding influence by controlling for 
the differences across public / private campus types and across campus carry / non-
campus carry states. The inclusion of campuses in all fifty states over a fourteen-year 
time series controls for larger demographic and economic trends over time and region 
that may also influence crime rates, and also allows for an assessment of changes in 
crime after the policy is implemented (e.g. the “impact” of the policy).  
 My primary empirical approach uses OLS regressions on crime variables that are 
calculated in rate form (crimes per 10,000 students). Results suggest that the impact of 
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campus carry is not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level across all five of 
the considered crime types. These results are robust to a number of different assumptions. 
Specifically, the primary OLS approach returns consistent results even when states with 
restrictive and uncertain campus carry implementation – Kansas, Oregon, and Wisconsin 
-- are thrown out of the sample entirely, indicating that inclusion of these states does not 
drastically bias the models. I also analyze the dependent variables in their original count 
form, using negative binomial regressions that may be more appropriate for over-
dispersed count data. This non-OLS approach does not show changes in significance 
across any of the considered crime variables. Moreover, all of these approaches are 
consistent when accounting for the possibility of serial autocorrelation in the data through 
the inclusion of lagged dependent variables. These time-lagged approaches generate 
considerably higher R2 values, suggesting that controlling for serial autocorrelation may 
be an appropriate modeling approach – though not one that produces substantial 
differences in the variable of interest. Unfortunately, high standard errors across model 
estimations prevent very precise conclusions. The results nevertheless suggest that 
campus carry policies do not have a dramatic impact on crime rates, in either a positive 
or negative direction.  
 If the deterrent effect theorized by Lott, Kleck, and Students for Concealed Carry, 
exists in settings with campus carry, it is unobservable by my models. On the other hand, 
my analysis also casts doubt on the narrative that campus carry enables criminal activity, 
particularly sexual assault. However, my analysis is supportive of a more nuanced 
progressive claim that, in fact, campus carry is not the larger determinant of crime rates. 
This line of reasoning suggests that changes in crime rates are, in reality, determined by 
larger underlying trends, such as changes in the stock of available guns, demographic 
trends, or shocks to the economy, rather than minor changes in legal handgun carrying 
from concealed carry.  
 Important limitations inherent to my analysis mean that this project is only a 
starting point for future research. My analysis is limited in the sense that it attributes 
changes in crime rates almost explicitly to changes in policy, while excluding potentially 
 63 
significant covariates in the modeling process. For example, I do not attempt to control 
for a number of variables that may predict crime on campus, including local population 
density, economic conditions, gun ownership rates, rates of concealed carry on campus, 
rates of incarceration, and so forth. The results of this analysis may be different when 
potential covariates are included in the models and, as such, these results should be 
considered preliminary. Future researchers may consider using my empirical framework 
as a starting point to undertake a more robust analysis that includes these covariates. 
 Also, the models I have described here may fail to capture the reality of campus 
carry laws in other ways. For example, the true impact of campus carry on crime may be 
changing over time. The models considered here apply only a constant impact, thereby 
failing to capture the possibility of such changes in the magnitude of treatment effect. In 
general, future research by other analysts might defensibly apply other assumptions than 
the ones I have used in the modeling process. For example, one could conceivably assign 
treatment effects that are allowed to differ across states, thereby better capturing the 
uniqueness of each state’s approach to the law. Unsurprisingly, any such analyses may 
find different results than those found here.  
 Finally, the origin of the data set should be emphasized to underscore its potential 
weakness in accurately describing the reality of campus crime. The ED data derive from 
crimes reported to police by campus communities. If stigmas against reporting incidents 
exist on campus, the data set may under-report crime. On the other hand, the ED statistics 
do not represent official crime convictions, but rather reports of criminal activity, and 
therefore could conceivably be subject to over-reporting. Analysts must therefore keep 
the potential for reporting inaccuracies in mind when discussing the results of studies that 
rely on ED data.  
 In addition to expanding on alternative versions of the current regression models, 
future researchers might consider undertaking more micro-level analysis of campus crime 
activity. This report produces a macro-level, nationwide view of campus violence, and so 
it may overlook significant changes that occur within a single locality. To uncover 
changes at a more local level, micro-level study could be done by examining a time series 
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of a single campus that implements campus carry, and comparing changes on the campus 
against those observed in the surrounding neighborhood or city.   
THE BIGGER PICTURE AND THE NEED FOR MORE RESEARCH 
 
 My analysis suggests that, when looking specifically at changes in crime rates 
committed on campus property, the implementation of concealed handgun carry policies 
does not provide measurable increases in campus safety through reduction in crime. 
Other, more robust statistical models produced by future research may suggest 
contrasting results. Even in such an event, analysts should be skeptical about the merits of 
campus carry. A focus on crime is but one lens through which campus carry can be 
evaluated, and policymakers must consider this practice within the larger context of other 
relevant factors that may also be affected. Although it is not the focus of this analysis to 
measure changes in these other factors, policymakers should be aware that even favorable 
impacts on campus crime due to campus carry might need to be traded off against 
unfavorable impacts on other events potentially related to gun ownership, such as student 
suicide rates, accidents, and communal feelings of safety.  
 There is considerable partisan debate surrounding the relationship between rates 
of gun ownership and rates of gun suicides within the context of campus carry.132 
Unfortunately, virtually no rigorous empirical evaluations have been conducted on the 
subject. This is due in large part to the fact that data pertaining to these events are not 
widely available at the campus level. Campus suicides, for example, are not recorded in a 
similarly robust fashion compared to campus crimes, making definitive evaluation on the 
association between campus carry and student suicide a difficult, if not impossible task at 
the moment.  
                                                 
132
 Common Arguments Against Campus Carry, Students for Concealed Carry, 2011, 
http://concealedcampus.org/common-arguments/#2. 
“More Guns - More Gun Deaths and Injuries,” The Campaign to Keep Guns Off Campus, accessed March 
17, 2016, http://keepgunsoffcampus.org/moreguns.html. 
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 Nevertheless, the wider body of public health literature strongly and nearly 
unilaterally suggests that gun ownership at the household level is a risk factor for suicide. 
Specifically, the connection between firearm accessibility and suicide in adolescents and 
young adults has been suggested empirically as far back as the early 1990s.133 This 
connection continues to emerge in more recent evaluations as well. For example, using 
panel data on suicides from 2001 to 2005 across all fifty states, Opoliner et al find that 
the prevalence of household firearm ownership is significantly and positively associated 
with overall state-level suicide rates, even when controlling for factors affecting mental 
health.134 Another study by Briggs and Tabarrok using data on suicides from 2000 to 
2009 across all fifty states showed that firearm ownership, as defined by a variety of 
different measures, was strongly and positively associated with rates of state-level 
suicide.135 Miller et al show that, even when controlling for region, unemployment, 
alcohol consumption, and poverty, changes in the level of household gun ownership, as 
measured by survey data, significantly and positively associated with changes in overall 
and firearm suicide rate over the 1981 to 2002 time period.136 Miller et al also use suicide 
data from 2008 to 2009 to show that household gun ownership is significantly and 
positively associated with both overall suicides and firearm suicides, even when 
controlling for state-level suicide attempt rates – in other words, that firearms are a risk 
factor for suicides independently of the underlying level of suicidal behavior in a state.137 
These few studies are truly only a small fraction of the total empirical literature produced 
                                                 
133 David A. Brent et al., “The Presence and Accessibility of Firearms in the Homes of Adolescent 
Suicides,” Journal of the American Medical Association 266, no. 21 (December 4, 1991), 
doi:10.1001/jama.1991.03470210057032. 
134 April Opoliner et al., “Explaining Geographic Patterns of Suicide in the US: The Role of Firearms and 
Antidepressants,” Injury Epidemiology 1, no. 6 (March 2014), doi:10.1186/2197-1714-1-6. 
135 Justin Thomas Briggs and Alexander Tabarrok, “Firearms and Suicides in US States,” International 
Review of Law and Economics 47 (March 2014), doi:10.1016/j.irle.2013.10.004. 
136 Matthew Miller et al., “The Association Between Changes in Household Firearm Ownership and Rates 
of Suicide in the United States, 1981-2002,” Injury Prevention 12, no. 3 (June 1, 2006), 
doi:10.1136/ip.2005.010850. 
137 M. Miller et al., “Firearms and Suicide in the United States: Is Risk Independent of Underlying Suicidal 
Behavior?,” American Journal of Epidemiology 178, no. 6 (August 23, 2013), doi:10.1093/aje/kwt197. 
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that point to the relationship between firearm ownership and suicide, including for 
college-aged demographics.138  
 Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that firearms regulation can lead to 
reductions in suicide rates in adolescent and college-aged youths. For example, Webster 
et al find that state-level safe storage laws, which require household firearms to be stored 
in safes or other devices when unused, are associated with modest reductions in suicide 
rates for youths aged fourteen to twenty.139 These findings may also apply to other 
populations as well. For example, Hoyt and Duffy find that implementing restrictions on 
firearm access successfully reduces rates of suicide among United States army soldiers.140  
 Again, there is no widely available analysis specifically on the relationship 
between gun ownership or ease of access to firearms and suicides among college and 
university students. It is therefore unproven whether this relationship remains true on 
college and university campuses experiencing campus carry. Nevertheless, policymakers 
should be willing to take the possibility of such a relationship seriously until more 
research is done, especially in light of the evidence presented within the wider body of 
public health research. Analysts should therefore not rule out the possibility that 
increasing student access to handguns, especially by allowing them to be stored in dorm 
rooms or other living facilities, could impact student suicide rates.  
 Arguably, expanding student access to handguns could result in an increase in 
student suicides by expanding access to lethal means for those experiencing feelings of 
crisis. According to the 2014 National College Health Assessment, a survey conducted by 
the American College Health Association, 1.3 percent of all post-secondary students self-
                                                 
138 I point the curious reader to the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health website for a fuller review 
of the relationship between suicide and firearm ownership, particularly to the “Means Matter” project. 
“Means Matter Basics,” Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, September 11, 2012, accessed May 1, 
2016, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/means-matter/means-matter/. 
139 Daniel W. Webster et al., “Association Between Youth-Focused Firearm Laws and Youth 
Suicides,” Journal of the American Medical Association 292, no. 5 (August 4, 2004), 
doi:10.1001/jama.292.5.594. 
140 Tim Hoyt and Vicki Duffy, “Implementing Firearms Restriction for Preventing U.S. Army 
Suicide,” Military Psychology 27, no. 6 (November 2015), doi:10.1037/mil0000093. 
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reported having attempted suicide within the previous year.141 The National Center for 
Education Statistics estimated that there were approximately 20.2 million total 
postsecondary students during this period.142 Assuming the results of the National 
College Health Assessment are generalizable to a national sample, a back-of-the-
envelope calculation suggests that as many as 262,000 post-secondary students attempted 
suicide in that survey year. Increasing student access to handgun ownership should be 
considered within this context, particularly given the suicide attempts by firearm are for 
more likely to be lethal than attempts by other methods.143 According to a Centers for 
Disease Control analysis of all completed suicides and estimated total suicide attempts in 
the United States in 2001, the average rate of fatality across the seven leading methods of 
suicide was seven percent; the rate of fatality for attempted firearm suicides was eighty-
five percent.144 Shenassa et al find that this disparity cannot be explained by a higher 
intention to die among those who attempt suicide by firearm.145  
 Therefore, if a subsequent analysis shows that campus carry reduces crime, a cost-
benefit exercise becomes crucial. How many crime reductions justify a potential increase 
in suicides? Policymakers should consider this potential tradeoff within the broader 
framework of their decision making process when weighing the merits of campus carry. 
 It may be worth briefly noting that increasing the prevalence of handguns on the 
campus environment may, by extension, also increase the number of accidental firearm 
discharges on campus. I opt to leave this topic mostly unexplored, though the UT-Austin 
Campus Carry Working Group notes that incidents of accidental handgun discharges 
                                                 
141 Spring 2014 Reference Group Executive Summary, American College Health Association, 2014, 
http://www.acha-ncha.org/docs/ACHA-NCHA-II_ReferenceGroup_ExecutiveSummary_Spring2014.pdf.  
142 “Digest of Education Statistics, 2014,” National Center for Education Statistics, accessed April 30, 
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143 Though it should be noted that fewer than 262,000 students would actually be subject to campus carry 
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144 Vyrostek SB, Annest JL, Ryan GW, “Surveillance for fatal and nonfatal injuries–United States, 2001,” 
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 2004:53(SS07);1-57, accessed May 1, 2016, 
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have been a very rare event on campuses that allow concealed handgun carry, suggesting 
this tradeoff may be less dramatic.146  
 Campus carry may also impact variables that do not readily lend themselves to 
statistical modeling or easy cost-benefit analysis. For example, according to the UT-
Austin Campus Carry Working Group, many respondents from the UT-Austin 
community indicated that they expected concealed carry to have a chilling effect on 
freedom of speech due to feelings of fear and intimidation.147 Studies referenced in an 
earlier section of this report suggest that these feelings may be widely shared across 
different institutions.148 The potential for communal anxiety and academic censorship 
following campus carry implementation must therefore also be considered.  
 As such, for those hoping to achieve a robust discussion on the merits of campus 
carry, a focus on campus crime is too narrow a framework. Other important variables 
such as suicides, accidents, and campus anxiety must be kept in mind for any 
policymaker considering implementation of the policy. In addition to refining the 
statistical models presented here, future research should continue to focus on the many 
variables that must be considered within the wider campus carry decision framework.  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CAMPUS CARRY STATES 
 
 Given the trends in state legislatures discussed at the outset of this report, it seems 
likely that more states will pass campus carry measures in the future. Those states that do 
pass such policies should take serious care to devise approaches that address the need for 
safe handgun storage and carry practices. In this vein, states might consider heeding 
advice generated by the American Medical Association: “The 4 practices of keeping a 
gun locked, unloaded, storing ammunition locked, and in a separate location are each 
associated with a protective effect [for those living in households with firearms] and 
suggest a feasible strategy to reduce [suicides and unintentional] injuries in homes with 
                                                 
146 University of Texas at Austin, Campus Carry Policy Working Group: Final Report. 
147
 Ibid. 
148 Ryan Patten, et al, “Packing Heat.” 
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children and teenagers where guns are stored.”149 In practice, campus carry states should 
implement this advice by providing biometric gun safes in locations where handguns are 
allowed (e.g. in dorms rooms, as the case may be) and requiring that handguns be stored, 
as the American Medical Association recommends, locked, unloaded, and separate from 
ammunition, which also be kept locked.  
 Furthermore, campus carry states should require that all concealed carriers on 
campus have their handguns placed within a restraint holster, that the restraint holster be 
within reach of the carrier at all times, and that handguns not be carried with a round in 
the chamber in order to minimize the risk of accident.  
 Finally, university systems implementing campus carry should begin gathering 
data on student suicide and accidental discharges – if they are not already. A robust data 
gathering process will allow campus administrators to closely monitor how the 
environment on campus responds to the implementation of concealed carry. By doing so, 
administrators can track potential crises, should they arise, and intervene appropriately.   
 The astute analyst will note that the above recommendations are derived directly 
from the UT-Austin approach to campus carry.150 Policymakers determined to pass 
campus carry should reference this approach, which is embodied in the UT-Austin 
Campus Carry Working Group’s officially adopted list of twenty-five recommendations 
for university-wide concealed handgun procedures. This list of recommendations clearly 
expresses an intent to balance concealed carry with practices that achieve relative 
safeguards of the public health, and might therefore be considered a starting point for 
future approaches to the law, where it is passed. 
 
                                                 
149 David C. Grossman et al., “Gun Storage Practices and Risk of Youth Suicide and Unintentional Firearm 
Injuries,” Journal of the American Medical Association 293, no. 6 (February 9, 2005), 
doi:10.1001/jama.293.6.707. 
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Appendix 
Figure 2: Time series of average rate of forcible sexual assault by public / private 
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Figure 6: Time series of average rate of aggravated assault by public / private school 
in Mississippi 
















































































































I drop graduate and non-traditional programs, such as law, medical, and seminary 
schools, among a number of others from the sample on the basis that these programs may 
have different associations with crime rates that I cannot control for in the statistical 
modeling process. For example, graduate programs may be commuter schools that 
experience higher rates of motor theft, seminary schools may have student bodies that are 
culturally different from other programs, and so forth. This process is meant to refine the 




The initial data set (n = 45,702) contains observations that are recorded at a very precise 
geographic level. For example, the University of Alaska - Fairbanks (UA-F) has seven 
observations in 2001 (e.g. “Bristol Bay Rural Campus”, “Northwest Rural Campus” and 
“Chukchi Rural Campus”, among others). Each of the seven UA-F campuses records its 
own crime statistics for that year. Unfortunately, these observations incorrectly list 
student enrollment at the UA-F level rather than at the campus level. To be specific, each 
of the seven UA-F 2001 observation lists a student enrolment of 7,142 - the entire UA-F 
enrolment for that year. Without correcting for this, rate calculations would often include 
campus-level crimes over university-level populations - an “apples to oranges” 
comparison. As such, in order to ensure proper rate calculations, I aggregate precisely 
recorded individual campuses such as these into a single observation to reflect the 
regional university they belong to. Again using the UA-F 2001 example, eight forcible 
sexual assaults occurred throughout all seven of the campuses for that year. I combine 
these occurrences to represent a single observation for UA-F 2001. I do this relying on 
the theoretical assumption that each of the seven UA-F campuses abide by the same 
overall university policies. The number of observations reduces by 14,093 when I apply 




With the exception of Kansas, campus carry states appear to have implemented concealed 
carry policies beginning in July or August to reflect the beginning of the new school year. 
Without accounting for this, my statistical models would incorrectly assume that a 
campus experienced full treatment effects throughout the entire first year of 
implementation. Therefore, I do not code the treatment into the affected campuses until 
the first full calendar year of implementation. However, when the July/August-start 
campuses first experience concealed carry, I do attempt to capture potential “half-year” 
effects by activating a separate dummy variable during these years. For example, this 
dummy variable is active for Mississippi public schools in 2011, for Colorado public 




In the primary OLS estimations (Table 10 and Table 11), I assign Kansas, Oregon, and 
Wisconsin to the treatment group (e.g. Treat = 1), but never assign them to a post-
implementation period (e.g Post = 0). The triple difference estimator (Treatj x Typei x 
Postt) is therefore never active for either public or private campuses in these states, 
reflecting their on-the-ground restrictive implementation or uncertainty.   
 
Note 5  
 
Sample mean for aggravated assault: 2.644 (See Table 3, Descriptive Statistics by Year) 
 
Lower end of 95% confidence interval: X – 1.96(SE) = -0.511 – 1.96(0.594) = -1.675 
 
 Max possible decrease below overall mean: (-1.675 / 2.644) x 100 = % -63.360 
 
Upper endpoint of 95% confidence interval: X + 1.96(SE) = -0.511+1.96(0.594) = 0.653 
 
 Max possible increase above overall mean: (0.653 / 2.644) x 100 = % 24.710  
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